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Abstract
This paper presents an overview of hardware implementations for the two commonly
used types of Public Key Cryptography, i.e. RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC), both based on modular arithmetic. We first discuss the mathematical back-
ground and the algorithms to implement these cryptosystems. Next an overview
is given of the different hardware architectures which have been proposed in the
literature.
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1 Introduction
Growing demands for security are characterizing the vast majority of commu-
nication and computer systems. In order to secure a system, various crypto-
graphic protocols are required. These protocols can be implemented in hard-
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ware and software. However, hardware appeared to be the ultimate choice
considering security, as well as efficiency. Indeed, hardware implementations
are faster in general, offering at the same time more intrinsic security. The
“ideally designed” hardware should offer a scalable architecture to overcome
the well-known drawback of limited flexibility.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman introduced the idea of public key cryptogra-
phy [43]. They used this concept to eliminate the need for prior agreement
of a secret to exchange confidential information. Also, digital signatures were
introduced which allow to uniquely bind a message to its sender. Since then,
numerous public-key cryptosystems have been proposed and all these systems
based their security on the difficulty of some mathematical problem. The most
prominent examples are RSA, named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir and
Adelman [165] and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC), which were proposed
by Koblitz [104] and Miller [128]. When comparing these two most popular
public-key cryptosystems, there are several aspects to be taken into account
such as: security, key lengths, speed and implementation issues. For security,
the hardness of the underlying mathematical problem is essential. It is impor-
tant to point out that ECC offer equivalent security as RSA for much smaller
key sizes. The reason is that all algorithms solving the mathematical problem
on which ECC are based take fully exponential time. Other benefits include
higher speed, lower power consumption and smaller certificates which is espe-
cially useful in constrained environments (smart cards, cellular phones, pagers
etc.). It also seems that it may be easier to secure ECC implementations
against side channel attacks. The basic operation for ECC is point multiplica-
tion which relies on efficient finite field multiplication. Commonly used finite
fields in ECC protocols are GF (p) and GF (2n). The basic operation for RSA
is multiplication in GF (p). As a consequence, a substantial amount of research
is focused on efficient and secure implementation of modular multiplication in
hardware.
Schaumont and Verbauwhede presented the engineer’s view on the security do-
main in the form of a security pyramid as shown in Figure 1 [168]. The pyramid
form represents the design space at multiple levels of abstraction. The most
abstract representation of a cryptographic application is the security protocol
architecture, which details what steps make up a secure communication. The
next level represents the security algorithms. RSA and ECC are at this level.
The operations used for RSA and ECC are derived from number theory and
create the next level. Beyond the level of number theory we run into levels
that deal with implementation issues. Finally, at the bottom level we express
all aspects of a security algorithm in terms of targeted platform technology.
An introductory report about hardware implementations of different public
key cryptography systems can be found in Abdelgurfi et al. [1] and in Beth
and Gollmann [18]. A comparison of public-key cryptosystems (PKCs) for
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security and efficiency can be found in [37].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the require-
ments for implementations of public-key algorithms in numerous applications.
In Section 3, we introduce the RSA cryptosystem, which is still the most
popular public key cryptosystem. We present some commonly known algo-
rithms for modular multiplication and exponentiation, which have advantages
in hardware. We elaborate on the algorithm of Montgomery which is proven
to be very efficient in avoiding the time consuming trial division and hence
a common choice in the majority of architectures. We also discuss relevant
implementations which are mainly based on systolic arrays. We conclude this
section with the leading examples of RSA cryptosystems including the state
of art in special applications, such as various Chinese Remainder Theorem
(CRT) schemes. Section 4 introduces the basic details of the Discrete Log-
arithm based cryptosystems. We give the mathematical background and a
number of examples in different types of basis. Section 5 describes the elliptic
curve arithmetic and algorithms for the basic operations in a finite field. We
list the most relevant ECC processors in both types of commonly used finite
fields i.e., of characteristic 2 or some big prime number. Section 6 concludes
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the paper.
2 Requirements for PKC Applications in Hardware
As already mentioned, scalability, together with interoperability and security,
represents one of the most important requirements of nowadays cryptographic
applications. That property is resulting in increased flexibility of hardware
which was usually associated only with the FPGA solutions. Details can be
found in the presentation by Paar [151]. According to Tenca and Koc [187],
an arithmetic unit is called scalable if: “the unit can be reused or replicated
in order to generate long-precision results independently of the data path pre-
cision for which the unit was originally designed”. More precisely, the longest
path should be “short” and independent of operands’ length and designed in
such a way that it fits in restricted hardware regions, as defined by Gutub
et al. in [76,77]. This means that the arithmetic unit can handle arbitrary
bit-lengths with the exception of memory limitations and the number of clock
cycles per operation is dependent only on the actual size of the operands. Typ-
ical scalable architecture has performance graphs as presented in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Performance of modular exponentiation for three different types of RSA
technology [16].
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Considering bit-lengths required for RSA and ECC, ECC keys are much
shorter than RSA keys. In short, for RSA 1024 bit-lengths are still in use
but it is assumed to upgrade those to 2048 and even 4096 bits. On the other
hand ECC keys are expected to stay in the range from 160 to 256 bits within
the next 10-15 years. Lenstra and Verheul [116] showed that 1937-bit key size
RSA may be considered to have an equivalent security as 190-bit key size
ECC. In the same work, the authors estimated that 190-bit ECC keys are
expected to be suitable for commercial security in the year 2021.
Implementation attacks exploit weaknesses in specific implementations of some
cryptographic algorithm. Undesired result is often some leakage of side-channel
information, which is usually correlated to the secret key. There are various
types of information that might leak from an implementation. Usually we
distinguish between invasive and non-invasive attack.
Microprobing techniques are example of invasive attacks. These techniques can
be used to access the chip surface directly. Thus one can observe, manipulate
and interfere with the integrated circuit as explained by Anderson and Kuhn
in [9,10]. They usually require several hours of work in a specialized laboratory
and during the process the packaging is destroyed.
Smartcard processors are particularly vulnerable to non-invasive attacks, be-
cause the attacker has full control over the power and clock supply lines.
Examples are: glitch attacks [10], attacks using electromagnetic radiation [62],
timing attacks [78,108], power analysis attacks [109,127] etc.
A timing attack uses the amount of time to run a cryptographic algorithm
as a basis for the attack. These attacks were first mentioned by Quisquater
in 1989. In 1996 Kocher [108] showed how to attack both symmetric-key and
public-key algorithms with this type of attack.
The most recent type of non-invasive attacks, the so-called differential power
analysis attacks, are discovered by Kocher and his associates. The basic idea
behind this type of attack is the observation that the power consumed at any
particular time during a cryptographic operation is related to the instruction
and (possibly sensitive data) being processed. There are two basic attacks:
simple power analysis attack (SPA for short) and differential power analysis
attack (DPA). While SPA allows for extracting sensitive information easily,
requiring only a single (or a few) power-consumption graphs, DPA is more
demanding. It consists of performing a statistical analysis of many executions
of the same algorithm with different inputs. DPA exploits the correlation be-
tween power consumption and specific key-dependent bits which are used at
some steps of the protocol. We can say that DPA is more powerful than SPA
but also is a “high-cost” attack in the sense of feasibility. Both attacks, es-
pecially combined together or with other attacks are serious threats to smart
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card security. A special type of attack called fault attack influences either
external (power supply, clock) or internal parameters (voltage or light on a
single cell or transistor) to modify the state of the circuit. This attack was
introduced by Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton in 1997 [24]. The idea behind this
type of attack is the fact that from time to time the hardware performing the
computation may introduce errors.
While all attacks on and defenses of cryptographic hardware get increasingly
sophisticated, experience has learned that protecting hardware implementa-
tions of cryptographic algorithms is easier than protecting software only im-
plementations.
3 RSA Cryptosystem
3.1 The Algorithm
The RSA cryptosystem was invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in
1977 [165]. It is a widely used system for providing privacy and ensuring
authenticity of digital data, i.e., in all applications where security of digital
data is a concern. RSA is still the most popular cryptosystem, especially for
high-end devices that are typically used in e-commerce and Virtual Private
Network (VPN) servers. RSA is based on modular exponentiation.
The private key of a user consists of two large primes p and q and an exponent
d. The public key consists of modulus N = p × q (at least 1 024 bits) and
an exponent e such that e = d−1 mod lcm((p − 1), (q − 1)). To encrypt a
message M the user computes: C = M e mod N and decryption is done by:
M = Cd mod N . This equality follows by Euler’s theorem (see Koblitz [105]).
The RSA function is usually defined as x 7→ xemodN , and private exponent
d is referred to as a trapdoor enabling one to invert the function. Since its
invention RSA was carefully scrutinized and no devastating attack has been
found in the sense of breaking RSA by inverting its function. Some choices
have to be avoided mainly considering required bit-lengths but it seems that
proper implementation can still be trusted. Boneh [23] gives a nice overview of
attacks on RSA. It is evident that modular exponentiation and also modular
multiplication are the most important operations which have to be considered
in detail.
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3.2 Modular Exponentiation
The dominant cost operation in the RSA cryptosystem is modular exponentia-
tion, namely computingM e mod N . The basic technique for exponentiation is
repeated square and multiply (see Knuth [103]). In [124] this method is called
Left-to-right binary exponentiation (see [124] by Menezes, Oorschot and Van-
stone). A similar algorithm is also used for point multiplication in ECC. In
this case the analogous scheme is called double-and-add (see [19] by Blake,
Seroussi and Smart).
Algorithm 2. Modular exponentiation
INPUT: integers 0 ≤M < N , 0 < e < N , e = (et−1, et−2 · · · , e0)2
et−1 = 1 and N
OUTPUT: M e mod N
1. A→M
2. For i from t− 2 to 0 do:
2.1 A→ AA mod N
2.2 If ei = 1, then A→ AM mod N
3. Return (A)
Numerous methods for speeding-up exponentiation and point multiplication
have been proposed in the literature; for a survey see [71] by Gordon. Re-
cently, side-channel security is also considered to be an important factor for
the choice of a suitable exponentiation algorithm. These methods are divided
into three large groups: generic methods i.e., methods which can be applied to
any finite abelian group, exponent recoding techniques and special methods
developed for particular operations (as in Gallant et al. [61]). We will give a
short description of these methods.
3.2.1 Generic Methods for Exponentiation
These methods can be widely applied in all types of groups hence also in ECC
algorithms.
Mostly mentioned are various windowing techniques as a generalization of
the basic algorithm in which more than one bit of the exponent is processed
per iteration. The basic idea is as follows: the exponent is divided into digits
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(windows). Algorithm 2 can thus be considered as a special case where the win-
dow size is equal to 1. For the sliding window methods these windows do not
necessarily have the same length. The exponent is divided into zero and non-
zero windows. In the work of Koc¸ [30] different variants of the sliding window
method are proposed. These methods also include a precomputation phase in
which some powers of M are precalculated. The number of pre-calculations
varies according to the window size. Considering different parameters various
trade-offs are possible.
A similar idea is used in the comb techniques, which precompute tables
that depend on M (Lim and Lee [119]). These methods are very useful for
applications with fixed base M such as signature schemes.
When the exponent is fixed, it is very useful to use addition chains [124].
Namely, subtractions have the same cost as additions, so it is possible to com-
bine both operations for point multiplication on elliptic curves. The purpose
of addition chains is to minimize the number of multiplications required for
an exponentiation. A comprehensive and detailed discussion can be found in
Knuth [103].
3.2.2 Exponent Recoding Techniques
Exponent recoding techniques replace the binary representation of an expo-
nent with a representation which has fewer non-zero terms (see Gollmann et
al. [69]). Many techniques for exponent recoding have been proposed in the
literature. In this section we will discuss signed-digit representation.
Signed Digit representation
Consider an integer representation of the form k =
∑l
i=0 si2
i, where si ∈
{−1, 0, 1}. This is called the (binary) signed digit (SD) representation [124].
The representation is redundant. For example, the integer 3 can be represented
as (011)2 or (101¯)2, where 1¯ = −1. It is said that an SD representation is sparse
if it has no adjacent non-zero digits. A sparse SD representation is also called
a non-adjacent for (NAF). Every integer k has a unique NAF which has the
minimum weight of any signed digit representation of k.
3.2.3 Special Methods for Exponentiation
Many special techniques have been proposed which take advantage of some
special property of an underlying field, or an elliptic curve etc. As an example,
Walter introduced the MIST algorithm [207,206], which is claimed to offer a
good protection against power analysis-based attack without losing too much
on efficiency. His method selects are random between different short windows.
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3.3 Modular Multiplication
Modular multiplication forms the basis of modular exponentiation which is
the core operation of the RSA cryptosystem. It is also present in many other
cryptographic algorithms including those based on ECC. The most algorithm
for modular multiplication is Montgomery’s method [130].
3.3.1 Montgomery’s Multiplication Method (MMM)
In 1985 Peter Montgomery introduced a new method for modular multipli-
cation [130]. The approach of Montgomery avoids the time consuming trial
division that is the common bottleneck of other algorithms. His method is
proven to be very efficient and is the basis of many implementations of mod-
ular multiplication in hardware as well as software.
The notation is as follows:
Mont(X, Y ) = XY R−1modN (1)
For a word base b = 2α, R is usually chosen such that R = 2r = (2α)l > N .
There is a one-to-one correspondence between each element x ∈ ZN and its
representation xRmodN. This representation is usually referred to as Mont-
gomery representation. The method requires conversion of x and y to an N -
residue domain and conversion of the calculation result back to the integer do-
main. The procedure is as follows. To compute Z = xyRmodN, one first has to
compute the Montgomery function of x and R2modN to get Z ′ = xRmodN.
Mont(Z’, y) gives the desired result. When computing the Montgomery prod-
uct T = XY R−1modN, the following procedure was proposed [124]:
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Algorithm 1. Montgomery Modular Multiplication
INPUT: Integers N(odd), x ∈ [0, N − 1], y ∈ [0, N − 1], R = 2r,
and N ′ = −N−1mod 2r
OUTPUT: xyR−1modN
1. T ← 0. (Notation T = (tltl−1...t0))
2. For i from 0 to (l -1) do:
2.1 mi ← (t0 + xiy)N ′mod 2α
2.2 T ← (T + xiy +miN)/2α
3. If T ≥ N , then T ← T −N
4. Return (T)
In the original notation of Montgomery after each multiplication a reduction
was needed (step 3 in the algorithm above). The input had the restriction
X, Y < N and the output T was bounded by T < 2N . The result of this is
that in the case T > N , N must be subtracted so that the output can be used
as input of the next multiplication. (As modular exponentiation is consisted
of repeated modular multiplications.) To avoid this subtraction a bound for
R is presented by Walter in [205] such that for inputs X, Y < 2N also the
output is bounded: T < 2N .
The work of Walter offers many other useful results for Montgomery’s tech-
niques. In [202], which is further improved in [205], he showed that the Mont-
gomery exponentiation method requires no final subtraction, which is very
important for fast implementation. Another benefit is that conditional state-
ments, which may be subject to side-channel attacks such as timing attack,
power analysis attack etc. may be omitted. Some other results considering
constant time implementations which is presumed to be a first step towards
secure hardware solutions are proposed in Hachez and Quisquater [79].
A bound on R has to be found such that with X, Y < 2N the output of
the Montgomery multiplication T < 2N . Batina and Muurling [16] found this
bound as follows: write R ≥ kN , then:
T =
XY +mN
R
=
XY
R
+
m
R
N <
4
k
N +N (2)
where, m = (XYmodR)N ′modR.
Hence, T < 2N for k ≥ 4, implying: 4N ≤ R. To guarantee the existence of
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the modular inverse of R, R and N should be relatively prime. This excludes
4N = R. The final round in the modular exponentiation is the conversion to
the integer domain, i.e., calculating the Montgomery function of the last result
and 1. The same arguments as above prove that this final step remains within
the following bound: Mont(T, 1) ≤ N .
Koc¸ et al. discussed five different Montgomery multiplication algorithms in
the [32]. For all five methods the space and time requirements have been an-
alyzed in detail. For a general class of processors the most efficient method
is identified. The algorithms differ on the basis of two factors. The first fac-
tor is whether multiplication and reduction are separated or integrated. In
the separated approach, reduction is done after multiplication. In the inte-
grated approach, the algorithm alternates between multiplication and reduc-
tion which can be either coarse-grained or fine-grained, depending on how
often one switches between these two operation. The second factor is the type
of scanning which can be either operand scanning or product scanning. As the
most efficient method, the authors identified the Coarsely Integrated Operand
Scanning.
An architecture based on Montgomery’s algorithm is probably the best studied
architecture in hardware. Differences appeared because of a different approach
for avoiding long carry chains. Most common ways to do so are: systolic array
and redundant representation.
3.3.2 Other Algorithms
The basic algorithm for computing A · B mod N (starting from the MSB)
repeatedly adds to a running total of R, the product B∗ of the next digit of
multiplicand A with the multiplier B. After that, a shift up is performed. At
the end the result R is reduced by a multiple of the modulus N to yield the
residue. This procedure can be sped up with interleaving modular subtraction
by repeated shift and add. Then R stays roughly the same as the size of the
modulus which saves the register space. Eldridge and Walter proposed other
techniques for speeding up modular multiplication in [48]. In comparison with
Montgomery’s algorithm, this algorithm: reverses the order of handling the
digits of multiplicand A, performs a shift up instead of down and does a
subtraction rather than an addition. A detailed comparison between these two
algorithms with respect to hardware is presented in the work of Walter [203].
3.4 Architectures for RSA
Soon after its invention, the first proposals for RSA hardware implementa-
tions appeared, such as [163] by Rivest. In the past two decades different
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architectures were proposed. The systolic array architecture, that was pro-
posed already in 1965 by Atrubin [13], still appears to be the best solution
for modular multiplication with very long integers. This architecture has been
studied intensively, both from a theoretical and a practical viewpoint.
3.4.1 Systolic array
A systolic array is typically defined as a grid-like structure of special process-
ing elements (PEs) that processes data much like an n-dimensional pipeline
(see Johnson et al. [97]). Each line indicates a communication path and each
intersection represents a cell or a systolic element. One simple example is given
in Figure 3 which represents a 1-dimensional systolic array.
Fig. 3. Systolic array (1-dimensional) with processing elements (PEs).
The systolic array architecture, as an ideal candidate for computationally in-
tensive operations, is often used for RSA implementations. Nevertheless, these
types of architectures can be used in various applications of PKC. In 1992
Dixon and A. K. Lenstra [44] used a systolic array architecture to build hard-
ware for the elliptic curve factoring method (ECM) which was proposed by
H. W. Lenstra in [117]. The factoring algorithms are of continuing interest for
the analysis of various public-key cryptosystem for obvious reasons. It is clear
that factorization of the modulus results in recovery of the secret key, and
hence in breaking RSA. The ECM has expected run time dependent on the
size of the factors which makes this method very suitable for breaking various
“multi-factor” schemes. The systolic array-based hardware presented in [44]
is consisting of 128 × 128 array of processing elements (PE array). Each of
the PE’s can carry out approximately 2 · 105 additions per second on 32 bit
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integers and has 64KB of memory. The implementation is massively parallel
and based on Montgomery’s multiplication.
Various systolic arrays for modular multiplication have been proposed in the
past ten years, for example [204,48,93,199,192], but very few practical imple-
mentations have been reported to our knowledge (see also [20]). Some of the
proposals are 1-D arrays such as [111,177,194] others are 2-D arrays (e.g.,
[199,96]).
S. Even was the first one to realize that a systolic array combined with Mont-
gomery’s multiplication facilitates cryptographic systems [52]. He used the
Atrubin’s multiplier [13] to which he added a systolic array for modular re-
duction. This modular reduction circuit was required for division by Mont-
gomery’s parameter R.
Other early proposals for hardware for Montgomery’s Multiplication Method
(MMM) include [48] by Eldridge and Walter and [111] by Kornerup.
Eldridge and Walter have observed that the algorithm of Montgomery in a
systolic array offers an ideal solution for RSA cryptography. The reason is
that in this case the modular correction and carry signals are similarly cor-
rected. Before this work, it was believed that redundant number systems were
required, because of the clash in the direction between the movement of the
carries and that of the multiple of the modulus. This was resolved by Mont-
gomery’s reversing the multiplication order i.e., choosing digits from least to
most significant and shifting down instead of up.
However, the work of Iwamura et al. [92] is the first one to our knowledge
presenting the systolic array which can execute a modular exponentiation
operation using Montgomery modular multiplication. They also proposed a
novel algorithm for modular exponentiation without subtracting N for every
MMM. In this way an output of each MMM can be directly fed back into
the next MMM. The same authors were also first to introduce the idea of a
scalable architecture [93]. They did not name this idea scalability, but they
suggest the design’s ability to cope with various precision in bits.
The first definition of scalability is given in [187] by Tenca and Koc¸. The
authors introduced a pipelined Montgomery multiplier, which has the ability
to work on any given operand precision and is adjustable to any chip area. The
first feature they call scalability and treat as unique in comparison to other
designs. Apparently, the architecture described in that work is not purely
systolic and has the flavor of a serial-parallel implementation.
Systolic arrays based on Montgomery’s algorithm
The systolic array presented by Walter [199] has a throughput of one modular
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multiplication every clock cycle and a latency of 2n+2 cycles for n-digits mul-
tiplicands. A full, rectangular, systolic array with one row for each addition
step is described. The number of rows is as large as necessary to complete
a modular multiplication. Further the author discusses possibilities of fewer
rows and mentions the linear form as a single row which would perform two
multiplications in parallel by feeding the output directly back in. In [48] this
architecture is compared with previous techniques showing that this method is
up to twice as fast and more suitable for hardware than other techniques (pro-
posed by Brickell [26], Orup [146] etc.) Decrease of the depth of combinatorial
logic implied the ability to use a faster clock speed.
In [204] Walter shows how to adapt the array [199] to modular exponentiation
without having to buffer results or idle between successive multiplications. As
further improvement PEs can be reduced from two multipliers to one which
makes them work on every cycle instead of only on alternate cycles. This
array was an alternative array to linear arrays of Kornerup [111] and Jeong
and Burleson [96].
A linear, purely systolic array forming a digit-serial multiplier was introduced
by Kornerup [111]. He was also inspired by the array of Atrubin [13] which is
linear systolic array of the similar type, but with a much higher cell complexity.
The linear array of Kornerup performs multiplication along slanted lines (see
Figure 4). In this way each cell forms and accumulates two terms from each
column in each cycle. Therefore, only dn
2
e cells are needed and the result of
multiplication is produced in 2n cycles. As it can be observed from Figure 4
each cell communicates only with the nearest neighbors, thus making this array
suitable for large multipliers operating at a very high clock frequency. It is
also shown how the multiplier can perform modular division and facilitates the
modular inversion. This work offers some original ideas in order to fully utilize
the array. Two halves of his PEs are running in parallel. His array has superior
latency but requires two copies of the array for efficient exponentiation. Hence
area× time complexity is thus similar to that of Walter.
Iwamura et al. [93] proposed two types of systolic arrays that perform the
Montgomery method without conditional subtraction of the modulus. The
systolic arrays consist of a fixed number of PEs. These two new arrays were
compared with their previous proposal [91] and the conclusion was that hard-
ware based on Montgomery method is more efficient then systolic arrays based
on non-Montgomery modular multiplication. Here, the hardware efficiency is
defined as a ratio of processing speed and circuit scale (# PEs). The inputs
A and B, T (result of Mont(A,B) = ABR−1modN) and modulus N are di-
vided into digits, where digit-length of A, say d is bounded from below with
the digit-length of remaining parameters, say v (hence v ≤ d). However this
requirement is not affecting the flexibility they claim. The processing speed
can be further improved by increasing the number of chips which are supposed
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Fig. 4. The organization of systolic array of the architecture [111].
to be realized as some kind of a cascade connection. The authors have also con-
sidered the usual bottleneck for hardware implementations of Montgomery’s
algorithm, i.e., the fact that the number of output bits may exceed the number
of input bits. They derived the bound R > 2n+2 for R = 2r and concluded
that r = n + 2, is the minimum possible value for which the examination of
the size of the output each time the Montgomery method is executed, may
be omitted. Here, n is the maximal number of bits for N , so N < 2n. This
bound can be further improved to the condition R > 4N , which is according
to work presented in [205] by Walter, proved to be the best possible bound in
practice.
The work of Tiountchik and Trichina [190,191] aim to design a pure systolic
array such that the complete exponentiation process can be carried out by a
single systolic unit. They used the ideas of Walter and Eldridge [199,48] to
construct the array that does not need feeding back output as a new input
nor joining separate units for multiplication and squaring. The Dependence
Graphs (DGs) were created for Montgomery multiplication and for squaring
separately. The chain of DGs for these two stages forms a new DG for Mont-
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gomery based exponentiation. Hence, each PE has to be able to operate in
two modes. To control the operation modes, one bit control signal is fed into
the rightmost PE and then pumped through the array.
Considering modular exponentiation on FPGAs, more recent work include [156,21,22].
Elbirt and Paar evaluated some options in FPGA architecture suitable for
PKC in [47]. First of all, redundant representations and systolic array imple-
mentations are both found to be suitable for high-speed addition algorithms.
This results in a performance increase for modular multiplication and therefore
for cryptographic algorithms.
In [21], Blum and Paar have derived a modular exponentiation architecture
based on Montgomery’s method on a single FPGA (for bit lengths of up
to 1 024 bits). The Montgomery parameter R is set as R = 2n+3 instead of
R = 2n+2 > 4N . In this way, the number of repetitions for Montgomery’s al-
gorithm is n+3 for radix 2 implementations. Still, they have avoided the orig-
inally proposed final comparison and subtraction by performing a pipelined
exponentiation algorithm. The PEs are consisted of u = 4, 8, 16 bits and only
n/u PEs are used. Similar to the approach by Kornerup [111], squarings and
multiplications are performed in parallel. A full modular exponentiation is
computed in 2(n + 2)(n + 4) clock cycles with a latency of n/u clock cycles.
Note that Blum and Paar have also reported an implementation with high-
radix in [22]. In order to speed-up the design they describe a high radix version
of Montgomery’s algorithm which reduces the amount of cycles per modular
multiplication. A full modular multiplication of 2 · (n+2)(m+10) clock cycles
with an n-bit exponent and an m-digit modulus is achieved. For an optimal
speed area trade-off a radix of 16 was chosen.
Su et al. [177] rewrote the algorithm of Montgomery in order to execute mod-
ular multiplication two times faster. Each iteration in this algorithm requires
only one addition, compared with two of Montgomery. The number of iteration
remains unchanged resulting in the doubled speed for modular multiplication.
The proposed algorithm is implemented by a 2’s complement multiplier and
a modular shifter-adder, both of which are designed as linear cellular arrays
with n cells for a word length of n. Each cell contains one full adder and
some controlling logic. They also proposed a suitable modular exponentiation
algorithm which calculates a modular exponentiation in 2n2 clock cycles.
Two new systolic architectures are proposed in Tsai et al. [194] to improve
the computation speed of modular multiplication. The comparison with some
other prominent examples such as those of Walter and Kornerup indicates that
this proposal offers the highest speed, lower hardware complexity and lower
power consumption (for 1 024-bit RSA). However, as the issue of scalability
was not addressed the remaining question is how it would perform for diverse
bit-lengths as required in nowadays applications.
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Other systolic array, non-Montgomery:
As Montgomery’s algorithm showed to be the best option by far in hardware,
there were not so many other proposals. Some of them are worth mentioning
such as those of Iwamura et al., Freking and Parhi, etc.
Iwamura et al. considered in [91] two implementations of RSA cryptography
in hardware using modular multiplication other than the one of Montgomery.
They tried to create a flexible architecture, where they defined flexibility as
“the degree of linearity between the processing speed and the circuit scale”.
The number of PEs on a chip was therefore optional to facilitate the choice
for a favorite scale. However, in their later work [93] they conclude that this
array is not as efficient as the hardware based on the method of Montgomery.
Jeong and Burleson [96] described two algorithms for modular multiplication
and their array structures. The algorithms are based on the iterative Horner’s
rule and the proposed arrays can be fully pipelined. However, these linear ar-
rays require 50% more cycles per multiplication than the array of Walter [204].
Only one multiplication is also performed at once, comparing with two in [204]
and although they use the same number of PEs as Walter, they are more com-
plex. Thus their PEs only operate on every third cycle.
Freking and Parhi [58] proposed three new architectures and compared all of
them. They obtained a linear performance-area trade-off. Signal broadcasting
is eliminated due to bit-level based systolic array thus providing a possibility
for very high clock rates. The authors have achieved a scalable array without
taking advantage of the algorithm of Montgomery. Three new architectures
they named as follows: cascade, cylindrical and higher-radix. The first two
methods are based on binary modular multiplication. The cylindrical array
is a 2-D array which deploys a feedback pipelining technique. An alternative
approach to obtain scalability is based on a parallelization of a partitioned
computation which is used in the array cascade approach. This array consists
of a cascade of linear arrays, each assigned to process one partition. When com-
paring these two architectures, it is obvious that the cylindrical array exhibits
some pipelining overhead which is overcome with the array cascade method.
Therefore, the cylindrical array does not feature constant average computa-
tion time for some bit-length n. It is also dependent on the number of rows
in the array. For the third array scalability is achieved through adjustment of
the radix. However, as in [146], the radix of the implementation will not be
matched to the algorithmic radix in order to prevent exponential cell growth.
The algorithm chosen instead of Montgomery was invented by the authors
in 1999 [57] and named “Power-of-Two Radix IRA algorithm”. Namely, they
considered the algorithm of Montgomery being not so well-suited for systolic
high-radix computations.
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3.4.2 Non-systolic array
Architectures based on Montgomery
The use of high radices in modular multiplication was for a long time consid-
ered not to be an efficient solution due to complex determination of quotient
digits for the modular reduction (see [48]). The algorithm of Montgomery
did not change that perception completely, but some signs of possible im-
provements were obvious. Namely, the high radix approach gives potential
for substantial speed improvements of modular multiplication although often
criticized for a large hardware depth (meaning a slow clock frequency). Hence,
a vast majority of reports from this area was oriented on systolic arrays.
There are only few Montgomery based architectures which are not systolic
arrays. One of the most mentioned is the one of H. Orup. He introduced
rewritten MMM, suitable for high radices where the obtainable clock frequency
was meant to be independent of the choice of radix. Orup [146] presented an
alternative to systolic architecture where bit-level, carry-save arithmetic was
utilized to compute high-radix modular multiplication. An example of this
architecture was given for the radix 28 with 3 pipeline stages. The partial
result adder was composed of 4-2 carry-save adders rather than a high-radix
component. Scalability was targeted through algorithmic radix adjustment
(similar to Freking and Parhi [58]), but the design is characterized by low
clock rates due to global broadcast signals.
Marnane [122] presented an architecture for bit serial modular multiplication
in FPGAs. It is also a scalable architecture due to the re-programmability of
FPGAs.
We will mention one more recent work by Kim et al. [102]. They are also using
the value of 2n+2 for R in MMM to achieve reuse of the result as an input
for the next modular multiplication (while performing exponentiation). The
entire system of their 1 024-bit RSA processor is composed of the REDC part,
which calculates AB ·R−1 and the control part. The REDC part computes the
Montgomery modular multiplication and the control part controls all inputs
and outputs of the REDC. Since this architecture is not systolic, the addition
could not be operated by a full adder (then only one clock is needed). Hence,
this architecture requires 1 024-bit registers to store the operands in comput-
ing the addition. This would increase the hardware resources so instead they
used 32-bit carry propagation adders (CPA) with a shift register. More pre-
cisely they used two 32-bit registers, 2 multiplexors and a 32-bit CPA, which
is smaller then the previous solution. This solution requires 32 additional
clocks, but hardware requirements are minimized which reduces the chip size
substantially. They achieved a timing of 43 ms (at most) for a 1 024-bit RSA
operation. The lack of scalability is probably the most important disadvantage
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of this proposal.
Other-non-Montgomery
In 1981, Norris and Simmons [136] proposed delayed-carry adder to pro-
duce a hardware modular multiplier which computes the product of two t-bit
operands modulo t-bit modulus in 2t clock cycles. Brickell [26] improved this
concept to finish a modular multiplication in only t+7 clock cycles. A circuit
for Brickell’s multiplier is described in the work of Walter and Eldridge [208].
Orton et al. gave a nice collection of modular multiplication algorithms in [145].
They presented the implementation results of one of the algorithms which
was most efficient according to their results. The circuit included three K-
bit adders, K is the number of bits of modulus. It could finish one modular
multiplication in K + 2 clock cycles and had the throughput of 40 kb/s at
a clock speed of 200 kHz. By using the modular multiplication block a RSA
chip was produced by using 3µm CMOS technology and shown to correctly
perform RSA encryption (or decryption) at a clock speed of 200 kHz, which
corresponds to a rate of 4 kb/s. In the same work the authors presented a
standard basis serial finite field GF (2m) multiplier implementation.
In 1987, Sedlak [170] proposed a RSA Cryptography Processor (CP). In this
architecture exponentiation is implemented as a sequence of multiplications
and multiplication is implemented as a sequence of additions. Also the modulo
operation is implemented as a sequence of subtractions. The difference of this
approach and the classical algorithm is in the look-ahead algorithms which
decrease the maximum number of additions for multiplication and subtractions
for modulo operation are used. Because a realistic algorithm cannot look ahead
an unbounded number of bits, probabilistic functions are used to define the
ciphering rate.
In 1988, Hoornaert et al. [87] described a hardware implementation of the RSA
algorithm. They improved the classical double-and-add algorithm for modular
multiplication. The result was a more complex but more efficient circuit. They
designed a 120-bit chip and chips could be concatenated to arbitrary bit-
lengths.
Vandemeulebroecke et al. [195] presented a single chip 1 024-bit RSA processor
in 1989. They used Redundant Signed Digit (RSD) arithmetic in an RSA
computation for the first time. In the RSD representation, a number X can
be viewed as the difference between two positive binary numbers X∗ and X∗∗
as shown follows:
X =
n∑
i=0
xi2
i =
n∑
i=0
(x∗i − x∗∗i ) 2i, x∗i , x∗∗i ∈ {1, 0}. (3)
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Table 1
Main features of the RSA chip
Technology CMOS 2 µm with 2 metal layers
Transistor count 180,000
Chip size 80 mm2 (9.3× 8.7)
Power dissipation at 25 MHz 500 mW under 5 V
Baudrate (all 1 024 bits words) 8 kbits/s with a 25 MHz clock
Key storage Static, 2 pairs on the chip
I/O Serial or 8 bits parallel, asynchronous
Control On chip
As it can be seen from above equation, each digit xi belongs to the set {1, 0, 1}
where the upper bar indicates a negative value. Let Y = Y ∗−Y ∗∗ be a number
in redundant form, Z a number in two’s complement form and S = S∗ − S∗∗
the result of the operation of Y +Z or Y −Z, with y∗i , y∗∗i , zi, s∗i , s∗∗i ∈ {0, 1}.
The two’s complement of Z can be found as follows:
if Z =
∑n
i=0 zi2
i = (znzn−1 . . . z0)
then −Z = ∑ni=0 (1− zi) 2i + 1 = (1− zn1− zn−1 . . . 1− z0) + 1 (4)
So a subtraction reduces to an addition with an inversion of all bits and
adding of 1. The computation scheme can be implemented with one level of
full adders. The addition is fully parallel, thus requiring no carry propagation.
The multiplication and modulo operations are implemented by using repeat-
edly addition and subtraction respectively. Considering a unity add time for
the addition, both multiplication and modulo are ideally performed in n cycles.
The main features of the RSA chip are given in Table 1.
Findlay and Johnson proposed recursive sums of residues technique for mod-
ulo reduction in [56]. If the number P , to be reduced by the modulus m, is
expressed as follows:
P = [p1, p2, . . . , p2n] , pi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1 to 2n. (5)
then the modulo reduction can be written as:
P mod m =
(∑2n
i=1 pi2
i−1
)
mod m(∑2n
i=1 pi (2
i−1 mod m)
)
mod m
(6)
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The reduction is simply a conditional sum of powers of 2 reduced modulo
m: residues, hence the name of sums-of-residues (SOR) reduction. Details of
the design steps of the SOR architecture is given in [56]. A hardware modulo
exponentiator system consists of a hardware bit serial multiplier, followed by
a SOR reduction unit.
Morita proposed an algorithm based on higher radix than 2 in [132]. The
proposed algorithm is carried out by using the following equation repeatedly.
R(k−1) ← rR(k) + b(k)A− c(k)N (7)
where “k” is the step number of repeated processing, “r” is the radix number,
R(k) and R(k−1) are partial remainders, b(k)A is a partial product and c(k)N
is a modular subtractor. The algorithm is implemented in hardware for radix
4. It is reported in [132] that the 512-bit modular multiplier had about 50
Kgates and a delay time of about 8 µs. The delay time for 512-bit modular
exponentiation is reported as 6 ms.
Orup et al. proposed a hardware implementation of Eq. (7) [147] where they
estimated c(k) according to δ most significant bits of R(k). They gave the
simulation results for timing of one multiplication as 85 ns. The estimated
area is reported as 100 mm2.
Takagi and Yajima proposed to use the RSD representation of multiplicand
and multiplier to fasten the additions in Eq. (7) [183,184]. Takagi gave also the
hardware implementation results of his technique. He reported that a serial-
parallel modular multiplier based on the proposed algorithm had a regular
cellular array structure with a bit slice feature. The depth of its combinational
circuit part is a constant independent of n, bit length of the modulus. The
gate count of the combinational circuit part is about 19n. The total number
of bits for the registers is about 7n.
Walter proposed several techniques for speeding up modular exponentiation.
The first work is from 1991 and he used modulus scaling to calculate Eq. (7) [197].
In this approach N is scaled by a factor f such that fN has its q most signif-
icant digits fixed. The algorithm uses fN instead of N . Estimation of c(k) is
easier because it no longer depends on any q most significant digits of N , as
they are fixed. It is claimed in this work that this shortens the cycle time of
each iteration and gives a speedup factor of 70%. The second work was in the
same year and it was about an algorithm which calculates a residue R and
an integer quotient Q satisfying A × B = M × Q + R [198]. R is either the
smallest non-negative residue of A× B modM or differs by at most M from
it. A × B modM is calculated as (AS ×B modMS) /S for a fixed r-power
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S = rE. Henceforth, the Eq. (7) becomes:
Qk = ApproxQuot (rRS,MS)
RSk = 2RS + AS(k)B −QkMS
(8)
where “k” is the step number of repeated processing, “r” is the radix number.
In the paper different functions for ApproxQuot are investigated and a solution
is given.
He also proposed to split the computation of (A×B) modM into six distinct
phases in rnd(fract((A× B)× (1/M))×M where fract discards the integer
part of a real number, and retains the non-negative fractional part, and rnd
rounds a real to the nearest integer [200]. It is assumed that M−1 is already
known to just over 3m places after the point where m is the number of digits
in M , A and B. A and B and all intermediate results are represented in RSD
form, but not M or 1/M , which are in binary form. The multiplications are
done by a Wallace tree [196] construction. This tree has a maximum depth of
about log3/2 n 3-to-2 bit adders. However, this logarithmic time requires O(n
2)
area. He used the iterative application of a decomposition e = me′ + r, where
r is usually the least nonnegative residue of e mod m, to reduce the number
of multiplications used in exponentiation [201]. At each repetition the divisor
m is selected by reference to a pre-determined set of inexpensive pairs (m, r)
and the powers Am and Ar are computed. Ae satisfies the relationship
Ae = (Am)e
′
Ar (9)
When e′ = 0 has been processed, the partial product register contains the re-
quired output. So, ifm0,m1, . . .,mn is the list of divisors which this generates,
and r0, r1, . . ., rn are the associated remainders then,
Ae = Ar0+m0(r1+m1(...+mn−1(rn−1+mn−1rn)...)) (10)
and evaluation is performed by processing the exponent expression from left
to right. It is assumed that it is known how to calculate Am and Ar in the
most convenient way . So divisor/residue pairs (m, r) must be selected from a
set for which this information is known. Then at each step, the cheapest such
decomposition can be chosen from this fixed set of pairs. A sequence of pairs
(m, r) used to direct an exponentiation in this way is called a division chain.
In [201] Walter gave the algorithm to find the most efficient division chain,
the examples and the test results.
In [38] Chiang and Chen proposed a new modular exponentiation and mul-
tiplication algorithms to reduce the number of iterations for both of those.
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They also proposed a hardware structure for their algorithms and reported
the simulation results. Koon-Shik C. et al. proposed a radix-4 modular mul-
tiplication algorithm based on sign estimation technique (see [33] and [39]).
They reduced the number of partial products by using the radix-4 Booths
algorithm [25]. In a carry save adder, a partial sum, S, and carry, C, sequence
are generated in the intermediate stages and the carry propagation occurs
only at the last stage. The sign of a number in one’s or two’s complement
representations is indicated by the most significant bit. However, in the carry
save representation, the most significant bit (the sign bit) is not readily avail-
able. In order to compute the exact sign of the partial sum C + S, C and S
have to be summed in full precision. To solve this problem, the sign estima-
tion algorithm estimates the sign of a number represented by a carry-sum pair
produced by a carry save adder.
The algorithm proposed requires n/2 + 3 iterations for one modular multi-
plication. Two Radix-4 modular multiplications are executed simultaneously.
The number of clock cycles required to complete the modular exponentiation
is n (n/2 + 3) clock cycles. The total time for one modular exponentiation is
13 ms at 40 MHz and the number of gates is 230,000.
3.4.3 Residue Number System
Nowadays even faster arithmetic is demanded due to the constant improve-
ments in factoring and the resulting requirements for even longer key sizes. In
order to achieve that, the Residue Number System (RNS) is an alternative to
the radix representation. RNS arithmetic is a very old idea which relies on the
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and it provides a good means for very
long integer arithmetic.
Let 〈x〉a denote an RNS representation of x, then:
〈x〉a = (x[a1], x[a2], . . . , x[an]) (11)
where, x[ai] = xmod ai. The set a = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is called a base (of size
n). It is required that gcd(ai, aj) = 1 for i 6= j. CRT implies that the integer
x which satisfies 0 ≤ x < ∏ni=1 ai is uniquely represented by 〈x〉a.
A well known advantage of RNS is that to add, subtract and multiply such
numbers we only need to compute the addition, subtraction and multiplica-
tion of their components, of size very much smaller than the original modulus.
Also carry-free arithmetic makes parallelization possible which is a very de-
sirable property in hardware. The final result is obtained by the CRT. The
disadvantages of an RNS representation are that it is difficult to compare the
size of elements and to perform division. To overcome this disadvantage, a
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combination with Montgomery multiplication was proposed [157].
According to majority of the previous work on this topic, most of the process-
ing time for RNS Montgomery multiplication is devoted to base extension.
A VLSI implementation for modular multiplication using RNS was proposed
by Alia and Martinelli in [8]. Two different implementations were proposed
in Bajard et al. [15] for an RNS Montgomery multiplication. In the work of
Posch and Posch [157] it was proposed that RNS should be used as the input
and output representation of the algorithm, but they did not provide any al-
gorithm for Radix-to-RNS (or vice versa) transformation. It is provided in the
work of Kawamura et al. [100] and Nozaki et al. [137]. The main contribution
of the work of Kawamura et al. is that they provided a new base extension
algorithm. They proposed a Cox-Rower architecture for the RNS Montgomery
multiplication. In this architecture, a base extension algorithm is executed in
parallel by n sets of Rower units controlled by a Cox unit. Each Rower unit
has a multiplier and accumulator with modular reduction by ai or bi where 〈a〉
and 〈b〉 are two RNS bases. The performance was only roughly estimated as
the VLSI design work was still ongoing. Detailed performance including CRT
figures is presented in Nozaki et al. [137]. An LSI prototype adopting the pro-
posed Cox-Rower architecture achieves 1 024-bit transaction in 4.2 ms and 2.4
ms without and with CRT respectively, which was comparable with the best
performances of commercial chips. This design can deal with key lengths up
to 4 096 bits in CRT mode. Relevant proposals for RNS hardware implemen-
tation include the work of Bajard et al. [15]. The authors have proposed two
different implementations using MMM.
3.4.4 CRT based implementations
Here, we explain about the CRT implementation of RSA which is an efficient
way to reduce the work factor of the decryption process. Use of CRT for
RSA was proposed in 1982 by Quisquater and Couvreur [158]. By means of
the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), the speed for the RSA decryption
scheme can be increased up to 4 times (see the book by Koblitz [105]). This
possibility is very attractive for practical applications. However, it includes
some pitfalls on security, so it has to be carefully implemented.
Let us consider again the RSA protocol for privacy. If user A, say Alice,
wants to send a message to user B (Bob), she represents her message in any
standardized way by a number M , 0 < M < N . Number N is the modulus,
i.e., N = p · q. Next, Alice looks up the public exponent eB of Bob. She will
send the cipher text C computed from:
C =M eBmodN (12)
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Bob can recover M from C by raising it to the power dB (private exponent of
Bob) which he only knows (here, eBdB = 1(modφ(N))):
Cd ≡M ed ≡M1+l·φ(N) ≡M ∗Mφ(N)l ≡MmodN. (13)
Where φ(N) is Euler’s Totient Function for which φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
Then, if Bob knows the factorization of N into p and q, he can do calcula-
tions mod p and mod q instead of modN . He computes Mp ≡ Cd1 (mod p) and
Mq ≡ Cd2 (mod q), (where C1 ≡ C (mod p) and C2 ≡ C (mod q)). All these
calculations are done modulo integers p and q that are typically half of the
length of N . The linear combination of Mp and Mq is the original message M .
More precisely, Bob first precomputes integers a and b satisfying:
a ≡ 1(modp)
a ≡ 0(modq)
(14)
and
b ≡ 0(modp)
b ≡ 1(modq)
(15)
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem,M is now given by:M = aMp+bMq(modN).
This method is known in the literature as Gauss algorithm [124]. Another effi-
cient algorithm for reconstructing the message M is Garner’s algorithm [124].
It reconstructs the M as follows.
M ≡Mq + q · (s · (q−1 mod p) mod p) (16)
where s ≡ (Mp −Mq) mod p)
These computations can be performed in O((lg n)2) bit operations. Altogether,
this way of decryption can reduce the workload by a factor of 4. (Here, we
assume cubic complexity of exponentiation.)
In April 2000 Compaq and RSA security Inc. announced a new patented tech-
nology MultiPrimeTM as a generalization of standard RSA scheme. Instead
of a modulus N = pq, as in traditional RSA system, N is a product of three
or more (distinct) prime numbers. The idea was that increasing the number
of factors and using CRT with parallel exponentiators increases performance.
In general, the dependence of the performance of modular exponentiation and
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the length of modulus is not linear. It is approximately cubic or quadratic
depending on the implementation. However, high level of security has to be
preserved. The length of N is not the only relevant factor that provides it.
Smaller factors make some methods of factoring more efficient, for example
the Elliptic Curve factoring Method (ECM). Current record is 53 digits for
smallest factor [46], which results in the use of not more than 4 prime factors
of N for the modulus lengths of 2 048 bits and up to three factors for 1 024
bit modulus. Figure 2 presents improvements of performances for CRT and
Multiprime compared with the common RSA scheme.
Another improvement in efficiency is expected for the situation where not all
factors differ. Instead of N = pqr, we consider for example N = p2q. This is a
special case of the RSA scheme where N = pnq, which was introduced in 1998
by Takagi [186]. This method appears to be more efficient than MultiPrime
with 3 different primes only when the public exponent e is relatively small
compared to the modulus length. Figure 5 represents the performances for
different e for architecture in [16] for all 3 CRT schemes (N = pq, N = pqr
and N = p2q).
Fig. 5. Performances of modular exponentiation in relation with the size of the
public exponent e for three different types of CRT technology [16].
One example of utilization of CRT is presented in Grosscha¨dl [72]. In this
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paper the multiplier architecture of the RSA crypto chip is presented. The
multiplier datapath is reconfigurable to execute either one 1 024 or two 512
bit modular exponentiation in parallel. In CRT-mode, the decryption rate is
increased by a factor of 3.5. The utilized multiplication algorithm is based
on the special type of modular reduction, so-called Barret’s modular reduc-
tion [124]. The binary exponentiation method (square-and-multiply) is used
for modular exponentiation. The author presents this architecture as a highly
scalable platform. Nevertheless, this prototype was optimized for 1 024 bits of
modulus length and a multiplier of word-size 16, and other values of parame-
ters were not tested.
Boneh et al. showed in [24] that for an implementation of RSA based on the
CRT, given one faulty version of the RSA signature, the adversary is able
to factor the RSA modulus. The attack can be applied on the general RSA
signature scheme (without CRT) as well, as introduced by Joye et al. in [98].
Some countermeasures, that would check the computation before releasing the
signature, were proposed. One of the most recent is suggested by Au¨muller
et al. in [14]. They were also first to prove that this type of attack is also
practical.
3.5 State of Art for RSA Hardware Implementation
Soon after the discovery of the RSA encryption algorithm, there were chips
available for performing it. The “first” RSA chip was designed by Rivest,
Shamir and Adleman in 1980 [164]. It was a single-chip nMOS design which
occupied 42mm2. It contained a 512-bit register for storage of intermediate
results, carry-save adder logic, and up-down shifter logic. In contained ap-
proximately 40,000 transistors but failed to work reliably. One of the other
early proposals dates back from 1981 by Lau and McPherson [112]. System
hardware consisted of a DES processor, some RAM and a 16 × 16 hardware
multiplier. Encrypting a message took 4.6 seconds and decrypting was up to
21 seconds (240 bits). However, a fast development of VLSI RSA circuits was
forecasted. R. Rivest reviewed the issues involved in building a special-purpose
chip for performing RSA encryption/decryption [164].
In the ’80s already several methods for implementing modular reduction were
known. In Brickell [26] the quotient digits are approximated using only the
high order bits of the divisor and the current remainder.
In 1985 Kochanski [107] proposed a RSA chip in which the modular exponen-
tiation operation was divided between a CMOS array and a microprocessor. A
full length modular multiplication took place in CMOS array by the commands
from microcontroller. The complete modular exponentiation was performed by
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microcontroller. The worst-case time for a 511-bit modular exponentiation was
133ms and the average was 100ms.
In 1986, Rankine [159] introduced an implementation of a 512-bit modulus
exponentiator for RSA applications. A wide range of applications including
smartcards was claimed. It was an ASIC employing 4kB of RAM and ALU
functions were based on 64-bit operations. This device, called THOMAS, was
able to execute a 512-bit exponentiation in less than a second. More precisely,
a full 512-bit decryption was performed in 750 ms.
Various speed-up techniques in hardware and software have been analyzed and
compared in Shand and Vuillemin [171]. These include: chinese remainders,
MMM, addition chains, quotient pipelining etc. The hardware used was a PAM
(Programmable Active Memory) implementation of RSA which is based on
PGA technology. The conclusions were that some small speed-ups, i.e., 1.25
and 1.5, are possible with precomputation of small powers for addition chains
(in hardware) and the use of MMM, respectively. However, chinese remainders
and quotient pipelining (facilitated with MMM) offer eventual speed-up of 4.
Various solutions for systolic arrays were proposed in the past ten years, for
example [48,199,93,204,192], but no implementations have been reported to
our knowledge (see also the work by Blum and Paar [21]).
The work of Tenca and Koc¸ introduces the notion of scalable hardware. The
authors have described a pipelined Montgomery multiplier, which has the abil-
ity to work on any given operand precision and is adjustable to the available
area and/or performance. The architecture described in that work is semi-
systolic and has a flavor of serial-parallel implementation. The authors propose
an algorithm in which the operand Y (multiplicand) is scanned word-by-word
and the operand X (multiplier) is scanned bit-by-bit. This organization al-
lowed some parallelism which has maximal degree of pmax = d e+12 e, where for
operands with m bits of precision, e = dm+1
w
e words are required. If less than
pmax processing units (PUs) are available, it causes the pipeline to stall. In
that case some buffering is necessary and the total execution time increases.
The certain number of pipeline stages is also a parameter considered in the
design. The propagation delay of the PU influences the clock cycle, although
it can be treated as independent of the word size w when w is relatively small.
Yet, having only few stages yields very poor performance for the high precision
range (512-1 024 bits) due to pipeline stalls. In this case the fixed area becomes
insufficient for large word sizes. However, the flexibility of this design provides
various design trade-offs. In this work the radix-2 algorithm is addressed and
higher radix was dealt with in Tenca et al. [188].
Savas¸ et al. [167] used the same design methodology to obtain a dual-field mul-
tiplier for both fields of use in cryptography i.e., GF(p) and GF(2n), without
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compromising scalability. The basic observation to provide the unified Mont-
gomery multiplier is that an adder module, equipped with the property of
performing addition with or without carry, is available. This dual-field adder
is basically a full adder which is capable of performing both types of addition.
This so-called dual multiplier would have obvious benefits for many applica-
tions of public key cryptography.
The contribution of [16] is in combining a systolic array architecture (see Fig-
ure 6), with a Montgomery based RSA implementation, achieving the same
notion of scalability as introduced in Tenca and Koc¸ [187]. Nevertheless, com-
parison of performances goes in favor of [16]. This is purely systolic array based
architecture with high levels of flexibility and scalability which were previously
treated as exclusive property of FPGAs based platforms or other non-systolic
ASICs such as one in Tenca and Koc¸. The optimal bound for Montgomery’s
parameter R is achieved which, with some savings in hardware, omits com-
pletely all reduction steps that are presumed to be vulnerable to side-channel
attacks. The ASIC product which is featuring this architecture is presented in
Figure 7.
Fig. 6. The systolic array presented in the architecture [16].
The most prominent chip manufacturers that have PKC implementations are
Atmel, Spyrus, Infineon, Siemens, Motorola, Philips and Certicom. The secu-
rity chip from Atmel is called NIMBUS [12]. It has the capability of generating
digital signatures with RSA for 1 024-bits. If the RSA algorithm with CRT is
used the time needed for one signature generation is 56 ms. This time is 225
ms if CRT is not used. Spyrus Inc. has a Universal Serial Bus (USB) crypto
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Fig. 7. Photo of the chip [16].
token which is called Rosetta USB [176]. It is FIPS 140-1 Certified and sup-
ports standards. Infineon’s SLE 66CUX640P is a security controller to use
in USB applications [89]. SLE 66CUX640P includes a public key coprocessor
for modular arithmetic. It supports RSA (up to 1024 Bit) and ECC (up to
256 Bit) over GF (p). The architecture of it is optimized for minimum power
consumption. Maximum clock frequency is 15 MHz. The total area of public
key coprocessor is 1 mm2 with 0.25 µm technology. The performance data of
the coprocessor is given in Table 2.
Siemens has an encryption integrated circuit (IC) called PLUTO-IC [86]. The
encryption rate of PLUTO-IC is reported as 2 Gbit/s. It is produced for
ECCs based on curves over GF (p), p of length 320 bit. ELCRODAT-6-2 is
another product from Siemens which is an encryption device for the ISDN-
telecommunication network. It is also designed for ECC based on curves over
GF (p), the bit-length of p is 256. Motorola has four different security pro-
cessors called MPC180, MPC184, MPC185 and MPC190 [133]. They are de-
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Table 2
The performance data of SLE 66CUX640P
Operation length of modulus execution time (@ 15 MHz)
[k]P on EC over GF (p) 160 bit 83 ms
[k]P on EC over GF (p) 256 bit 234 ms
ab mod N 1024 bit 220 ms
signed to enhance system performance by executing computationally intense
operations associated with the processing of IP Security Protocol (IPSEC), In-
ternet Key Exchange (IKE), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Wireless Trans-
port Layer Security (WTLS) protocols used in Broadband Access, Customer
Premise Equipment (CPE), Routers, WAP Gateways and other Access appli-
cations. They support ECC for WAP/WTLS support in wireless applications.
They include Public Key Execution Units (PKEUs) which can RSA, ECC,
Diffie-Hellman with programmable bit-lengths. Philips has SmartXA as a 16-
bit smart card IC [110]. It includes cryptographic co-processors for RSA. A
1 024 bit exponentiation takes 400 ms. Certicom provides the Luna CA3-ECC
and Luna 2-ECC hardware security tokens [35]. These PCMCIA type tokens
support ECDSA (163-256 bits), RSA (512-4096 bits), and Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) (512-1024 bits).
There are two surveys published about previous RSA implementations one is
by Brickell in 1989 [27] and the other is by Koc¸ in 1995 [31].
4 Discrete Logarithm based Cryptosystems
This section presents the public key cryptosystems which are based on discrete
logarithm problem (DLP). These cryptosystems include Diffie-Hellman key
agreement [43] and its derivatives, ElGamal encryption and ElGamal signature
scheme [49,50] and its variants.
Diffie-Hellman key agreement provided the first practical solution to the key
distribution problem, allowing two parties, never having met in advance or
shared keying material, to establish a shared secret by exchanging messages
over an open channel [124]. The basic version of this protocol is as follows:
(1) One time setup: An appropriate prime p and a generator α of Z∗p 2 ≤
α ≤ p− 2 are selected and published.
(2) Protocol messages:
A→ B : αx mod p (1)
B → A : αy mod p (2)
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(3) Protocol actions: Perform the following steps each time a shared key is
required.
(a) A chooses a random secret x, 1 ≤ x ≤ p − 2 and sends B message
(1).
(b) B chooses a random secret y, 1 ≤ y ≤ p − 2 and sends A message
(2).
(c) B receives αx and computes the shared key as K = (αx)y mod p.
(d) A receives αy and computes the shared key as K = (αy)x mod p.
The basic ElGamal encryption scheme is described as follows [124]:
(1) Encryption: B should do the following:
(a) Obtain A’s authentic public key (p, α, αa).
(b) Represent the message as an integer m in the range {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}.
(c) Select a random integer k, 1 ≤ k ≤ p− 2.
(d) Compute γ = αk mod p and δ = m · (αa)k mod p.
(e) Send the ciphertext c = (γ, δ) to A.
(2) Decryption: To recover plaintext m from c, A should do the following:
(a) Use the private key a to compute γp−1−a mod p.
(b) Recover m by computing (γ−a · δ mod p).
Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n. Let α be a generator of G and let
β ∈ G. The discrete logarithm of β to the base α, is the unique integer x,
0 ≤ x ≤ n − 1, such that β = αx. By knowing β to find x is called discrete
logarithm problem. Two examples for G are finite fields Fp, p is prime, and
F2m . Detailed information about finite fields can be found in [124,125].
As it is shown in the algorithms above, the main operations are modular
multiplication and modular exponentiation. The architectures that are given
in Section 3.3 and 3.2 can be used for the finite field Fp. In the following
sections we will present the different modular multiplication structures for the
finite field F2m .
4.1 Introduction and mathematical background
There are three main different ways to represent the elements in the finite
field F2m , polynomial, normal and dual bases. In the following we give brief
descriptions of these representations.
Polynomial (or standard or canonical) Basis
The polynomial basis (PB) is given by the set {1, α, α2, · · · , αm−1} where α is
a root of the prime polynomial P (x) of degree m used to construct GF (qm)
from GF (q).
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Dual Basis
Trace: F = GF (q), K = GF (qn) and α ∈ K. The trace of α relative to
subfield F is:
TrKF (α) = α+ α
q + αq
2
+ · · ·+ αqn−1 (17)
{α0, α1, · · · , αm−1} is a basis for GF (2m) over GF (2), so the elements of the
set are linearly independent over GF (2). The corresponding dual basis (DB)
is:
{β0, β1, · · · , βm−1} ⊆ GF (2m) such that:
Tr (αiβj) =
 1 if i = j0 if i 6= j (18)
Normal Basis
α is a root of the prime polynomial P (x) of degreem used to constructGF (qm)
from GF (q). Then the set
{
α, α2, · · · , α2m−1
}
forms a normal basis (NB).
4.2 Architectures for Modular Multiplication in GF (2m)
Mastrovito’s thesis [123] serves as an extensive reference of hardware archi-
tectures for performing GF (2m) multiplication. In this section we will give an
overview of bit-serial multiplication architectures to serve as a starting point
for further sections.
4.2.1 Polynomial-Basis Multipliers
Serial
In this section an architecture for bit-serial computation of products of two
elements of GF (2m) that are represented by PB will be described. This archi-
tecture is called as serial shift register (SSR) multiplier.
Let A(x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ am−1xm−1 and B(x) = b0 + b1x+ · · ·+ bm−1xm−1
are two field elements that will be multiplied. C(x) = c0+c1x+ · · ·+cm−1xm−1
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is the result of the multiplication. Then
C(x) = A(x)B(x) mod P (x)
= [b0A(x) + b1xA(x) + · · ·+ bm−1xm−1A(x)] mod P (x).
(19)
Each term bix
iA(x) in Eq. 19 can be computed recursively in the following
way
bix
iA(x) mod P (x) = (20)
(· · · ((bixA(x) mod P (x))x mod P (x)) · · ·)x mod P (x)
So C(x) can be written as follows:
C(x) = (((bm−1xA(x) + bm−2A(x))x+ bm−2A(x))x+ · · ·)x+ (21)
b0A(x) mod P (x).
The block diagram of SSR multiplier is shown in Fig. 8. The product C(x)
is found in C = [cm−1, cm−2, · · · , c0] register after m clock cycles. A schematic
view of SSR multiplier cell is shown in Fig. 9
Properties of SSR Multiplier: The length of the critical path is 4 (one
register, one AND-gate and two XOR-gates), independently of the choice of
P (x). This implies that the SSR allows the same clock frequency for any m.
The complexity is linear in m, exactly 6m (2m registers and 4m gates).
Parallel
Mastrovito proposed in his thesis [123] in 1991 a parallel multiplier which is
named after him. The architecture can be explained as follows.
The product C(x) = A(x)B(x) mod P (x) can be written in matrix form as
C = ZB, where Z is a binary m by m matrix. The entry zi,j of Z is denoted
by fi,j(A) or simply fi,j. The elements of C(x) can be written as following:
ci = b0fi,0(A) + b1fi,1(A) + · · ·+ bm−1fi,m−1(A) (22)
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Fig. 8. SSR Multiplier Block Diagram
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Fig. 9. Schematic view of SSR Multiplier Cell
In matrix notation the product can be written as following:
C =

f0,0 f0,1 · · · f0,m−1
f1,0 f1,1 · · · f1,m−1
...
...
...
fm−1,0 fm−1,1 · · · fm−1,m−1


b0
b1
...
bm−1

= ZB. (23)
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It is desirable to have explicit formulas for functions fi,j. The following symbol
is introduced for simplicity
sk =
∑
u+v=k
buav u, v ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m− 1} (24)
Further, an m − 1 by m binary matrix Q which is called reduction matrix is
defined as:

xm
xm+1
...
x2m−2

= Q

1
x
...
xm−1

=

q0,0 q0,1 · · · q0,m−1
q1,0 q1,1 · · · q1,m−1
...
...
...
qm−1,0 q1,m−1 · · · qm−1,m−1


1
x
...
xm−1

(25)
The reduction matrix is obtained from P (x) by a simple shift & add-on-
overflow procedure. Because,
xm mod P (x) = pm−1xm−1 + · · ·+ p1x+ p0
= q0,0 + q0,1x+ · · ·+ q0,m−1xm−1
(26)
q0,i = pi for i = 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1.
xm+1 mod P (x)
=q0,0x+q0,1x
2+· · ·+q0,m−1xm
=q0,0x+q0,1x
2+· · ·+q0,m−2xm−1
+q0,m−1 (q0,0+q0,1x+· · ·+q0,m−1xm−1)
= q0,m−1q0,0+(q0,m−1q0,1+q0,0)x
+(q0,m−1q0,2+q0,1) q0,1x2+· · ·+(q0,m−1q0,m−1+q0,m−2)xm−1
(27)
qi,0 = qi−1,m−1qi−1,0
qi,1 = qi−1,m−1qi−1,1 + qi−1,0
...
qi,m−1 = qi−1,m−1qi−1,m−1 + qi−1,m−2
(28)
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C(x) =
(∑m−1
i=0 aix
i
) (∑m−1
j=0 bjx
j
)
mod P (x)
=
∑m−1
i=0
∑m−1
j=0 aibjx
i+j mod P (x)
=
∑2m−2
k=0 skx
k mod P (x)
=
∑m−1
k=0 skx
k +
∑2m−2
k=m skx
k mod P (x)
=
∑m−1
k=0 skx
k +
∑2m−2
k=m sk
∑m−1
i=0 qk−m,ix
i
=
∑m−1
k=0 skx
k +
∑m−2
k=0 sk+m
∑m−1
i=0 qk,ix
i
=
∑m−1
k=0 skx
k +
∑m−2
k=0 sk+mqk,0 +
∑m−2
k=0 sk+mqk,1x
+
∑m−2
k=0 sk+mqk,2x
2 + · · ·+∑m−2k=0 sk+mqk,m−1xm−1
(29)
ci = fi,0b0 + fi,1b1 + · · ·+ fi,m−1bm−1 (30)
fi,0 = ai
fi,1 = ai−1 + q0,iam−1
fi,2 = ai−2 + q0,iam−2 + q1,iam−1
fi,3 = ai−3 + q0,iam−3 + q1,iam−2 + q2,iam−1
(31)
fi,j = σ (i− j) ai−j +
j−1∑
t=0
qj−1−t,iam−1−t (32)
where σ (k) is a step function defined by
σ (k) =
 1 k ≥ 00 k < 0 (33)
The multiplier is divided into two subsystems. The first subsystem computes
the functions fi,j and is called f -network. The second subsystem is called the
IP network and consists of m identical cells.
The Properties of Parallel PBMultiplier: The total complexity (in gates)
is denoted by C and the length of the critical path through the whole multiplier
is denoted by L.
2 + dlog2me ≤ L ≤ 1 + 2 dlog2me
1 +m(2m− 1) ≤ C ≤ (m− 1)(ωP − 2) +m(2m− 1) ≤ 3m(m− 1) + 1
ωP is the Hamming weight of P (x).
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The C and L depend on the selection of field generator.
4.2.2 Serial Dual-Basis Multiplier
Let A,B,C ∈ GF (2m) and C = A ∗ B be product. We assume that A is DB
representation and B is in PB representation, i.e, A =
∑
aiβi and B =
∑
biαi.
From duality relation and the properties of the trace function c0 can be ob-
tained as following (see Mastrovito [123], Section 3.2):
c0 = Tr (AB) = Tr (b0A) + Tr (b1αA) + · · ·+ Tr (bm−1αm−1A)
= a0b0 + a1b1 + · · ·+ am−1bm−1
= A ·B
(34)
where “·” denotes the inner product.
To obtain the second coefficient c1 A is replaced by αA in Eq. 34 and compute
the inner product (αA) · B, the third coefficient c2 is obtained by computing
(α2A) ·B and so on for the remaining coefficients.
The block diagram of DB multiplier is shown in Fig. 10.
Properties of DB Multiplier: The complexity of DB multiplier is 6m− 2
(2m registers and 4m−2 gates). The critical path has length 2+dlog2me (one
register+the inner-product logic).
4.2.3 Serial Normal-Basis (Massey-Omura) Multiplier
NB multiplier was first proposed by Massey and Omura [139]. So it was named
after them as Massey-Omura (MO) multiplier. The key property of the NB
representation is that squaring is a very simple operation. Let A = a0α +
a1α
2 + · · ·+ am−1α2m−1 be in GF (2m). Then
A2 = a0α
2 + a1α
4 + · · ·+ am−1α2m
= am−1α+ a0α2 + a1α4 + · · ·+ am−2α2m−1
(35)
In Eq. 35 the linearity of the squaring operation and the fact that α2
m
= α is
used. Squaring in NB is a simple cyclic shift of the element’s bits.
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b0 1b b2 m−1b
ci, i=0,1,...,m− 1
a0 a2 a3 am−1
Fig. 10. DB Multiplier Block Diagram
Let C = AB = c0α + c1α
2 + · · · + cm−1α2m−1 be the product. Then the last
coefficient cm−1 of C is a function of coefficients of A and B, i.e.,
cm−1 = f (a0, a1, · · · , am−1; b0, b1, · · · , bm−1) (36)
By Eq. 35 C2 can be written as following:
C2 = A2B2
= (am−1, a0, · · · , am−2) · (bm−1, b0, · · · , bm−2)
= (cm−1, c0, · · · , cm−2)
(37)
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which means that the last coefficient cm−2 of C2 can be obtained by apply-
ing the same function f to the components of A2 and B2. By squaring C
repeatedly, all the coefficients of C can be found as
cm−1 = f (a0, a1, · · · , am−1; b0, b1, · · · , bm−1)
cm−2 = f (am−1, a0, · · · , am−2; bm−1, b0, · · · , bm−2)
...
c0 = f (a1, a2, · · · , a0; b1, b2, · · · , b0)
(38)
The complexity of this multiplier depends on the function f which in turn,
depends on the choice of P (x). The schematic view of MO multiplier over
GF (24) with P (x) = x4 + x3 + 1 is shown in Fig. 11.
a0 a2 a31a
c i
i=3, 2, 1, 0
0 2 31b b b b
Fig. 11. The schematic view of MO multiplier over GF (24) with P (x) = x4+x3+1
The Properties of Serial NB (Massey-Omura) Multiplier: As a mea-
sure of the complexity of the Massey-Omura multiplier, the number of terms
aibj in f is used. This number is denoted by Nm. The complexity of MO mul-
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tiplier is: (Nm −m) XOR gates+ (2m− 1) AND gates+ 2m registers. The
length of the critical path is 2+ dlog2Nme (one register and the logic function
f).
Mullin et al. showed that Nm ≥ 2m− 1 for any NB in [135] and the concept
of optimal normal basis (ONB) is introduced. An NB is said to be optimum
if Nm = 2m− 1. There are two constructions given in [135] to obtain an ONB
in GF (2m). These constructions are called type I and type II.
4.2.4 Other Bases Representation
Parker and Benaissa presented multiplier architectures for redundant bases
representation (RBR) in [155]. RBR was proposed by Parhami in [154]. Wu et
al. presented multiplication, conversion and squaring architectures for finite
field computation using RBR in [220]. Drolet proposed a new representation
for finite field elements called polynomial ring representation (PRR) in [45]. He
also gave parallel and serial multiplier, exponentiation, inversion and division
architectures with PRR in [45]. Silverman proposed a new representation for
finite field elements in 1999 [172]. He called this method Ghost Bit Basis
(GBB). There is no multiplier hardware structure for this representation so
far.
4.3 State of Art for GF (2m) Multiplier Hardware Implementation
4.3.1 Standard Bases
In 1971 Laws and Rushforth proposed a cellular-array multiplier [113]. This
array exhibits a high degree of regularity and can be viewed as a device for
performing computations in space rather than in time. The block diagram of
cellular-array multiplier is shown in Fig. 12. The schematic view of a general
individual cell is shown in Fig. 13. The other work about this structure is from
Jain et al. [94]. They also fabricated a multiplier overGF (24) chip using CMOS
1.2 µm technology. The chip has an active area of 0.434mm2 and requires 1 076
transistors and is programmable for different irreducible polynomials.
In 1984 Yeh et al. [222] proposed similar architecture as [113]. They wanted
to implement not only AB mod P but also AB + C mod P . This is straight-
forward, because addition is simply bitwise XOR of elements. So they add one
more XOR gate to the cells of SSR and cellular-array multipliers to get their
architecture.
Hasan and Bhargava proposed a bit-serial systolic architecture for multipli-
cation in [82]. Hasan also proposed to use look-up table approach in [81].
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Fig. 12. Block Diagram of Cellular-Array Multiplier
Hasan et al. proposed two structures of parallel multipliers based on an ir-
reducible all one polynomial (AOP) of degree m and equally spaced polyno-
mial (ESP) of degree m(m + 1)i [83]. A polynomial f(z) =
∑m
i=0 fiz
i over
GF (2) is called AOP of degree m if fi = 1 for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m. A polynomial
g(z) =
∑sm
i=0 giz
i = zsm+zs(m−1)+...+z
s+1 = f(zs) over GF (2), where f(z) is an
AOP of degreem of degreem over GF (2) is called an s-ESP of degree sm. The
details of the proposed algorithms will not be given in this work. The total
delay of parallel AOP multiplier is DA + (m+ dlog2(m− 1)e)DX where DX
and DA denote the delay for an XOR gate and an AND gate, respectively. The
total number of XOR and AND gates are m2 +m− 2 and m2. Another work
about multipliers for fields defined by AOP and ESP was reported by C.-Y.
Lee et al. in [115]. They used systolic architecture for bit-parallel multipliers.
42
pi
z
y
A_IN
B_IN
FB_IN
B_OUT
A_OUT
FB_OUT
Fig. 13. The schematic view of cellular-array multiplier cell
The first work about composite field, GF ((2n)m) is from Paar [148,149]. Also
Paar and Rosner gave a comparison of multiplication in composite fields,
GF ((2n)m) and prime fields, GF (2m), m is prime in [153].
S.-W. Wei and Tsai and Wang used systolic architectures for parallel mul-
tiplication in [213] and [193], respectively. Wu proposed explicit formulas to
calculate the complexity of parallel multiplication in [214].
Orlando and Paar gave the results of their implementation of serial multiplier
on several FPGAs in [141]. The prototype implementations were done using
Xilinx XC4000X FPGAs of speed grade -09. The implementation results are
summarized in Tables 2 and 3 in [141]. They also gave timing estimations of
elliptic curve point multiplication using projective coordinates in their work.
Song and Parhi, Sunar and Koc¸, Halbutogullari and Koc¸ reported their results
on the Mastrovito multiplier in [175], [178] and [80], respectively. A system-
atic design way for Mastrovito multiplier was proposed by Zhang and Parhi
in [224].
The multiplier architecture from Hasan and Wassal [84] which was designed
by using triangular and polynomial basis together was fabricated. The de-
sign was optimized in CMOS 0.5 µm technology for a 3.3 V supply voltage.
The prototype can support operations over finite fields up to GF (264). The
silicon area used was approximately 3 : 445mm × 3 : 827mm for the whole
chip packaged in a 68 pin PGA package. The prototype chip was tested at a
clock frequency of 50 MHz. This frequency limitation is reported as due to
the packaging technology used. It is also reported in the paper that the im-
plemented chip core could run at a frequency of more than 80 MHz, while an
implementation with m = 256 was estimated to run at a frequency of more
than 75 MHz.
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Montgomery modular multiplication method (see Section 3.3.1) can be used
for multiplication over GF (2m) also. The papers by Wu [215,217] are good
references to learn about this technique.
Gao and Parhi implemented parallel multiplier by using two different ap-
proaches, irregular and regular semi-systolic [63]. They used 0.35 µm CMOS
technology to implement both structures for GF (28). They gave the area and
latency data in Table 2 which can be used for comparison of them. Another
parallel structure by Koc¸ and Sunar can be found in [34].
Yu gives comparisons for power consumption of semi-systolic array, Mastrovito
and composite field in [223].
4.3.2 Normal Bases
Wang et al. proposed a parallel architecture for Massey-Omura multiplier
in [209]. They fabricated a chip for GF (24) by 4 µm NMOS technology. The
chip has 8 pins and takes area of 1 248µm×996µm. Other parallel structures
were proposed by Koc¸ and Sunar, Reyhani-Masoleh and Hasan in [34] and
[162], respectively.
Because multiplication function, f , given in Section 4.2.3 depends on the irre-
ducible polynomial, every time the polynomial is changed the multiplier circuit
has to be changed. An algorithmic way to find f depending on any irreducible
polynomial was proposed by Wang in [210,211].
In 1988 Onyszchuk, Mullin and Vanstone proposed a different approach from
Massey-Omura multiplier and this invention can be found in [140]. Agnew et
al. improved the previous work and reported the results in [3]. In 1992 the
same authors reported the VLSI implementation of normal bases multiplier
in [5]. The chip was fabricated using 1.5 µm HCMOS gate array with a clock
speed of 40 MHz and required less than 12,000 gates.
Lu gave maximum, minimum and average values of the measure of the com-
plexity of the Massey-Omura multiplier, Nm, for different m in [121]. The
definition of Nm is given in Section 4.2.3. He proposed a way to find the
optimal multiplication function f .
An invention to realize composite field multiplication was made by Mullin and
presented in [134]. Because he used composite fields the multiplication is done
with more than one bit of the operands in one clock cycle.
Gao and Sobelman gave some VLSI design results in [66].
In [138] it is shown that composite fields using modified optimal normal bases
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can be classified into three cases as follows:
• Type I composite field: A subfield GF (2n)-Type II optimal normal basis
and an extension field GF (2nm)-Type I optimal normal basis.
• Type II composite field: A subfield GF (2n)-Type I optimal normal basis
and an extension field GF (2nm)-Type II optimal normal basis.
• Type III composite field: A subfield GF (2n)-Type II optimal normal
basis and an extension field GF (2nm)-Type II optimal normal basis.
In [138] multiplier structures for first two are given.
Sunar and Koc¸ gave algorithms for a type II ONM multiplier in [179]. Sutikno
and Surya proposed architectures for ONB multiplier in extension and prime
field [181].
Reyhani-Masoleh and Hasan proposed architectures for serial NB multiplier
in [160]. The same authors gave comparisons of algorithms for NB, type I
ONB and composite field multiplication in [161].
4.3.3 Dual Bases
Bit-serial systolic multiplier structures were proposed by Diab and Poli, in [42],
respectively. Fenn et al. proposed bit-serial and parallel multipliers and gave
delay and area comparisons of them in [55]. Wu, Hasan and Blake proposed
parallel multipliers in [218,219]. Lee and Lim defined a new dual basis called
circular dual basis (CDB) in [114]. They gave the algorithms for multiplication,
squaring, conversion and inversion in [114]. Gollmann reported some results
about ESP and dual basis in [68].
4.3.4 Works For Comparison of Different Bases
Hsu et al. reported their VLSI implementation results of 8-bit finite field multi-
pliers using dual, normal and standard bases in [88]. Their concluding remarks
about them were following:
• The DB multiplier occupies the smallest amount of chip area.
• As the order of the field goes higher, the DB multiplier will increase its
advantage over the others.
• The NB multiplier is very effective in performing operations such as inver-
sion, squaring, exponentiation.
• The area of the NB multiplier grows dramatically as the order of the field
goes up.
• The SB (PB) does not require basis conversion.
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• Due to PB’s regularity and simplicity, the design and expansion to higher
order finite fields are easier.
Paar and Lange presented VLSI implementation results of finite field multi-
pliers using dual, normal and standard bases for different orders in [152].
Ahlquist et al. presented FPGA implementation results of different finite field
multipliers in [7]. The performance of each finite field multiplier were char-
acterized on the Xilinx XC4062 FPGA. Table 2 in [7] shows resource usage
and clock speed data for all designs. From the results they concluded that
finite field multipliers optimized specifically for VLSI are not necessarily opti-
mized for FPGAs. They claimed that the following three significant flaws are
effective on the previous conclusion:
• Multi-clock cycle operation
• Long unregistered datapaths
• Under utilized logic elements
They modified their designs to avoid these flaws [7].
5 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
In this section, we introduce some basic notation and necessary mathematical
background about elliptic curves and elliptic curves based cryptosystem. For
a detailed exposure we refer to the cited literature [128,104,126,41,19].
5.1 Introduction and mathematical background
In order to introduce a public key cryptosystem based on elliptic curves, we
will first describe the elliptic curve group and define the Elliptic Curve Dis-
crete Logarithm Problem i.e., ECDLP, which is similar to DLP in the case of
arbitrary cyclic group.
Consider the set of all points on an elliptic curve E, together with one special
point, the so-called point at infinity (usually denoted as O). These points
form an additive abelian group with point addition as a group operation. (For
details on elliptic curve “group operation” see for example [126,106,19].)
Now we introduce the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
which difficulty is guarding the ECC protocols. Let E/Fq be an elliptic curve
and let P ∈ E(Fq) be a point of orderm. (Point is of orderm ifmP = O andm
is the smallest integer satisfying this equation.). Let Q ∈ 〈P 〉, so that Q = aP
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for some integer a, 0 ≤ a < m. The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem (ECDLP) is defined to be the problem of finding the number a for
a given P and Q. This problem is believed to be hard i.e., it is still unknown
if there exists an algorithm to solve it in less than fully exponential time.
The basic operation for ECC algorithms is point or scalar multiplication which
efficiency is mostly determined by the implementation of finite field arithmetic.
Both cases for finite fields of interest are considered.
5.2 Finite field GF (p)
An elliptic curve, defined over field GF(p), is the set of solutions (x, y) to an
equation of the form:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (mod p) (39)
where a, b ∈ GF (p) with 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0(mod p).
If (x, y) satisfies the above equation then point P = (x, y) is a point on elliptic
curve.
5.2.1 Point Addition
When the E is a curve defined as above, the inverse of the point P = (x1, y1)
is −P = (x1,−y1). The sum P +Q of the points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2)
(assume that P,Q 6= O, and P 6= ±Q) is the point R = (x3, y3) where:
λ = y2−y1
x2−x1
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
y3 = (x1 − x3)λ− y1.
(40)
For P = Q, we get the following, “doubling” formulae:
λ =
3x21+a
2y1
x3 = λ
2 − 2x1
y3 = (x1 − x3)λ− y1.
(41)
The point at infinity O plays a role analogous to that of the number 0 in
ordinary addition. Thus, P +O = P and P + (−P ) = O for all points P . In
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Figure 14 the example of point addition for an elliptic curve over field R is
given. A convenient way of thinking of this addition is that the three points
which are the intersections of a line with the curve have sum equal to 0.
Fig. 14. Geometrical representation of point addition in the affine plane over R.
P +Q+ (−R) = 0 hence R = P +Q.
There are many types of coordinates in which an elliptic curve may be repre-
sented. In the equation above affine coordinates are used, but so-called projec-
tive coordinates have some implementation advantages. The main conclusion
is that point addition can be done in projective coordinates using only field
multiplications, with no inversions required. Thus, inversions are deferred, and
only one needs to be performed at the end of a point multiplication operation.
A projective point (X, Y, Z) on the curve satisfies the homogeneous Weier-
strass equation:
Y 2Z = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3 (42)
and, when Z 6= 0, it corresponds to the affine point (X/Z, Y/Z). It appears
that other projective representations result in more efficient implementations
of the group operation. In particular, a weighted projective representation
(also referred to as Jacobian representation) is preferred in the sense of faster
arithmetic on elliptic curves [19,189]. In this representation a triplet (X, Y, Z)
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corresponds to the affine coordinates (X/Z2, Y/Z3) for Z 6= 0. In this case we
have a weighted projective curve equation of the form:
E : Y 2 = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6. (43)
Weighted projective coordinates provide very fast arithmetic. Conversion from
projective to affine coordinates costs 1 inversion and 4 multiplications, while
vice versa is trivial. If one implements addition and doubling in a way specified
in [189], the total costs for general addition is 1I + 3M in affine coordinates
and 16M in projective coordinates (11M if Z1 = 1 i.e., one point is given
in affine coordinates, and the other one in projective coordinates). Here, I
and M are denoting the modular inversion and multiplication operations, re-
spectively. In the case of doubling (with a = p − 3), this relation is 1I + 4M
in affine coordinates against 8M in projective coordinates. Thus, the choice
of coordinates is determined by the ratio I : M . Therefore, multiplication in
finite field is the most important operation to focus on when working with
projective coordinates. On the other hand, the extra inverter is required for
affine coordinates’ representation because one inversion has to be performed
for every field multiplication.
5.2.2 Point Multiplication
One can visualize this operation in a hierarchy structure as follows. At the
top is point multiplication. It is realized by means of repeated point additions
and doublings. At the next (lower) level are these operations which are closely
related to the coordinates used to represent the points. At the bottom level
are finite field operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and
inversion required to perform the group operation (see formulas 40-41). Some
works especially done for elliptic curve point multiplication algorithm can be
found in [129,74,40].
Point multiplication in elliptic curves is a special case of the general problem of
exponentiation in abelian groups. As such, it benefits from all the techniques
available for the shortest addition chain problem.
Certain properties of elliptic curve can be taken into account to obtain faster
algorithms. These properties are as follows:
(1) Elliptic curve subtraction has the same cost as addition, so the search
space for fast algorithms can be expanded to include shortest addition-
subtraction chains and signed representations (see Blake et al. [19]).
(2) The relative complexities of general point addition and doubling have to
be considered.
(3) For certain families of elliptic curves, specific shortcuts are available that
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can significantly reduce the computational cost.
Specific work on elliptic curve point multiplication algorithms can be found
in [131] by Morain and Olivos. Solinas explained how to use NAF for an elliptic
curve point multiplication in [174].
5.2.3 Hardware Implementations
Information about the hardware implementation choices for elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems can be found in [150,36].
Multiplication
As already explained, the performance of an elliptic curve cryptosystem is
primarily determined by the efficient realization of the arithmetic operations
(addition, multiplication and inversion) in the underlying finite field. If projec-
tive coordinates are used the inversion operation becomes irrelevant. There-
fore, coprocessors for elliptic curve cryptography are primely designed to ac-
celerate the field multiplication. Considering multiplication in the prime field
i.e., GF(p), the whole work which is done for the RSA implementation is rel-
evant. The only difference is that shorter bit-lengths are used i.e., 160-300
bits. Scalability is again a point of concern and even more interoperability be-
tween different implementations. Therefore, the idea about unified multiplier
that operates in both types of finite field GF (p) and GF (2n) was naturally
implied.
This idea was introduced by Savas¸ et al. in [167]. The authors have discussed
a scalable and unified architecture for a Montgomery multiplication module
(for detailed information about Montgomery multiplication method see Sec-
tion 3.3.1). They deployed an array of word size processing units organized in
a pipeline. The unified architecture requires only slightly more area than that
of the multiplier architecture for the field GF (p).
The same idea is the basis of work in Grosscha¨dl [73]. The bit-serial multiplier
which is introduced is performing multiplications in both types of fields. The
author also modified the classical MSB-first version for iterative modular mul-
tiplication. Namely, the modular reduction in this version is also performed
during multiplication. All concepts are introduced in detail, but the actual
VLSI implementation is planned as a future work.
Inversion
Modular inversion is also a vital operation for PKC protocols. It is used for
example, to calculate a private RSA key for decryption, for Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA for short) [189] etc. It is known to be
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the slowest operation that influenced expansion of various implementations
using projective coordinates. Yet, some inversions have to be performed even
then and the fastest and the most secure way to do so is a dedicated inverter
in hardware.
Several inversion hardware architectures were introduced but mostly inGF (2n).
Modular inversion is often performed by the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
(EEA) [105]. Kaliski [99] proposed a method of Montgomery Inverse which
is also derived from the EEA. Some other modular inverse studies based on
this technique followed, see the work by Savas¸ and Koc¸ [166]. The algorithm
proposed there, was implemented in hardware in Gutub et al. [77]. In this
work two VLSI hardware implementations are presented. Both are based on
the same inversion algorithm with the difference of one being fixed but fully
parallel and the other being scalable. Both designs have been compared based
on their speed and area. The area of the scalable design is on average 42%
smaller than the fixed one. This (scalable) design is proved to be superior in
almost all requirements presenting a very attractive solution for ECC.
5.2.4 State of art for ECC implementations over GF (p)
To the best of our knowledge, the only documented ECC processor over fields
GF(p) was proposed in Orlando and Paar [144]. This so-called Elliptic Curve
Processor (ECP) is scalable in terms of area and speed and especially suited
for FPGAs. The ECP is also best suited for projective coordinates and it
is using a new type of high-radix precomputation-based Montgomery mod-
ular multiplier (see Section 3.3.1). It consists of three main components: the
main controller (MC), the arithmetic unit controller (AUC) and the arithmetic
unit (AU). The MC is controlling the point multiplication. The AUC is re-
sponsible for point operations and it controls the AU. The AU is in charge for
GF(p) operations. It consists of a register file, an adder and a multiplier as the
most critical component. This multiplier performs a generalized version of the
Montgomery multiplication algorithm with quotient pipelining introduced in
Orup [146]. This version supports positive and negative operands and features
Booth recoding and precomputation. Positive and negative numbers appear
often in ECC algorithms and both are equally treated as subtraction has the
same cost as addition. The proposed ECP architecture was verified on an ex-
ample of the field GF(2192 − 264 − 1) which is one of the field recommended
by various standards. The scalability of the multiplier to larger fields was also
verified in the field whose size is 521 bits. The authors have estimated eventual
timing of 3 ms for computing one point multiplication.
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5.3 Finite field GF (2n)
The performance of an elliptic curve cryptosystem and of other public key
cryptosystems in general, is mostly determined by the efficient implementation
of finite field arithmetic. Special properties of binary finite fields GF (2n) such
as carry-free arithmetic, linearity of squaring etc. make them very attractive
for hardware implementations.
Composite extension fields, GF ((2n)m) are not recommended for security rea-
sons [67,60,173]. Namely, the method of Weil descent for solving the ECDLP,
as introduced by Frey [59], can be applied to those fields. This method does
not apply for curves over GF (2p) where p is prime, which are mainly defined
in the standards.
Affine coordinates:
We consider only non-supersingular curves, defined by equations of the form:
E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (44)
with a, b ∈ GF (2n), b 6= 0.
Projective coordinates:
We will now introduce weighted projective coordinates, where a projective
point (X, Y, Z), Z 6= 0, maps the affine point (X/Z2, Y/Z3). This corresponds
to use of a weighted projective curve equation of the form:
E : Y 2 +XY Z = X3 + aX2Z2 + bZ6 (45)
5.3.1 Point Addition and Doubling
Let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) be two points on E given in affine coordi-
nates. Assume P1, P2 6= O and P1 6= −P2. The sum P3 = (x3, y3) = P1 + P2 is
computed as follows:
If P1 6= P2,
λ = y2+y1
x2+x1
x3 = λ
2 + λ+ x1 + x2 + a
y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1
(46)
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If P1 = P2,
λ = y1
x1
+ x1
x3 = λ
2 + λ+ a
y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1
(47)
For a field of characteristic 2, the group inverse of a point P = (x, y) is
−P = (x, x + y). In either case, the computation requires on field inversion
(I ), two field multiplications (M ) and one squaring (S ), or 1I + 2M + 1S.
Conversion from projective to affine coordinates costs, in this case, 1I+3M +
1S. The computation sequences for point addition in this representation are
as follows: If P1 6= P2,
T1 = X1Z
2
2
T2 = X2Z
2
1
T3 = T1 + T2
T4 = Y1Z
3
2
T5 = Y2Z
3
1
T6 = T4 + T5
T7 = Z1T3
T8 = T6X2 + T7Y2
Z3 = T7Z2
T9 = T6 + Z3
X3 = aZ
2
3 + T6T9 + T
3
3
Y3 = T9X3 + T8T
2
7
(48)
If P1 = P2,
Z3 = X1Z
2
1
X3 = (X1 + dZ
2
1)
4
T = Z3 +X
2
1 + Y1Z1
Y3 = X
4
1Z3 + TX3
(49)
The different costs for point addition and doubling in characteristic two are
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Table 3
Costs of point addition and doubling in characteristic 2
Operation Coordinates
affine mixed projective
General addition (a2 6= 0) 1I + 2M + 1S 11M + 4S 15M + 5S
General addition (a2 = 0) 1I + 2M + 1S 10M + 3S 14M + 4S
Doubling 1I + 2M + 1S n/a 5M + 5S
given in Table 3.
5.3.2 Hardware Implementations
Squaring:
Hasan et al. proposed a squaring structure which requires m − 1 XOR gates
and has a time delay of one XOR gate in [83]. Jain et al. proposed semi-
systolic architectures for parallel squaring in polynomial basis [94]. Information
about the complexity of squaring can be found in the works by Wu [214,216].
Orlando and Paar proposed a squaring architecture which can be used also for
multiplications [143]. Wu used Montgomery modular multiplication method
(see Section 3.3.1) for squaring in polynomial basis in [215].
Inversion:
For any α ∈ GF (2m), α−1 = α2m−2. Let 2m − 2 be decomposed as 2 + 22 +
23 + . . .+ 2m−1; then α−1 can be expressed as
α−1 =
(
α2
) (
α2
2
)
· · ·
(
α2
m−1)
. (50)
Thus, the computation of inverse of α requires m− 1 squaring operations and
m− 2 multiplications [209,83].
Wang et al. proposed a chip to realize Eq. (50) by using repeated square and
multiply operations in normal bases [209]. Hasan et al. proposed a work for the
same purpose but by use of polynomial base representation [83]. Feng, Fenn
et al., Calvo and Torres and Takagi et al. proposed different representations
for 2 + 22 + 23 + . . .+ 2m−1 in [53], [54], [29] and [185], respectively. Wei used
the systolic architecture for modular multiplication and used this architecture
for repeated multiplications to realize Eq. (50) in [213]. Wang and Guo also
proposed a systolic architecture and claimed that their architecture has half
the area of Wei’s in [75,212].
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Another decomposition for 2m − 2 is as follows
2m − 2 =
(
2m/2 + 1
) (
2m/2 − 2
)
+ 2m/2. (51)
therefore α−1 can be computed by [90]
α−1 =
(
α2
m/2 · α
)(2m/2−2) · α2m/2
= y
(2m/2−2)
1 · α2m/2
= y−11 · α2m/2
=
(
y2
m/4
1 · y1
)(2m/4−2) · y2m/41 · α2m/2
= y−12 · y2m/41 · α2m/2
...
(52)
Applying similar procedure iteratively a recursive algorithm for computing
multiplicative inverses in GF (2m) is given in [90] by Itoh and Tsujii. They
used normal bases representation to be able to find the square easily. Asano
et al. generalized the recursive algorithm proposed in [90] for multiplicative
inverse computation for composite field GF ((2m)n) in [11].
Brunner et al. proposed a multiplicative structure which uses Euclid’s algo-
rithm to find the greatest common divisor (GCD) of two polynomials in [28].
Yan and Sarwate proposed systolic architecture for implementing Euclid’s al-
gorithm in [221].
Paar and Rosner gave the result of their FPGA implementation of inversion
in composite fields in [153]. Information about the complexity of inverse com-
putation can be found in the work by Wu [214]. Gao and Sobelman gave some
VLSI design results by using normal bases in [66]. Hasan and Wassal [84] im-
plemented inversion circuit which they proposed in the same work as a part of
their GF (2m) arithmetic processor. They used normal bases for representation
and extended Euclidean algorithm for GCD computation.
5.3.3 State of art for ECC Implementations over GF (2m)
The previous results about hardware implementations of elliptic curve point
multiplication over GF (2m) will be given in the following sections.
In 1989 Agnew et al. reported the first result for performing the elliptic curve
operations on hardware [4]. To achieve this they used their earlier normal
basis multiplier as arithmetic unit and a Motorola M68008 as control unit.
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The system could calculate about 9 elliptic curve points per second for k with
Hamming weight of 30. The throughput of the system is about 5 Kbps. Agnew
et al. also used Motorola M68030 as control unit and implemented a GF (2155)
processor in [5]. If point multiplication by an integer with Hamming weight
30 is considered, this will require about 154 point doublings and 29 additions.
The device will be able to perform at least 145 integer multiplication per
second, approximately 50 Kbps. In elliptic curve systems, the same base point
P can be used repeatedly. Then all of the squares can be precomputed, which
will increase the throughput by a factor of 4 to approximately 200 Kbps. The
storage requirements for the point squarings is less than 6 Kbytes.
In the work of Agnew et al., how Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal protocols can be
efficiently implemented using the group of an elliptic curve over a finite field
is described. VLSI implementation of an arithmetic processor in GF (2155) is
discussed [6]. In designing the arithmetic coprocessor, the following criteria
were deemed essential:
• a compact architecture consisting of only the essential registers and the
interconnections required to realize the optimal normal basis multiplier,
• the coprocessor must have an extremely fast and wide I/O system,
• a simple and efficient instruction set.
The instruction set and cycle counts are shown in Table 4.
The processor is called GF155MIC. The finished device required the equivalent
of about 11,000 gates and run at the design target speed of 40 MHz (clock).
Sutikno et al. also proposed a VLSI design and implementation of arithmetic
processor over GF (2155) in [180]. In this work the field inversion is performed
by the method of Agnew, Beth, Mullin and Vanstone [2]. It needs 23 field
multiplications for m = 155. This method is used for accomplishing area
optimization. The arithmetic processor has 32-bit wide internal bus. It has
15 instructions and 5-bit length for its operation codes (3 bit LSB used for
selecting instruction and 2 MSB for selecting the active register.)
The instruction set and cycle counts are shown in Table 5.
The architecture of the arithmetic processor is shown in Fig. 15. The arith-
metic processor includes the subsystems such as:
(1) Arithmetic Module
(2) Main Controller
(3) Register Selector
(4) Internal 32-bit Bidirectional Bus
The arithmetic processor is implemented on FPGA based using Xilinx XC4020XL.
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Table 4
Instruction Set
Operation Size Clock Cycles
MULT 155 bit blocks 156
INVERSE 24 multiplications approx. 3 800
I/O 5-32 bit transfers per register 10
WRITE(A, B, or C) write to register 2
READ(A, B, or C) read from register 2
NOP
ROTATE(A, B, or C) 155 bit parallel operation 2
COPY 155 bit parallel operation 2
(A← B)
(A← C)
(B ← A)
(B ← C)
SWAP(A↔ B) 155 bit parallel operation 2
CLEAR(A, B, or C) 155 bit parallel operation 2
SET(A, B, or C) 155 bit parallel operation 2
ADD(A⊕B) 155 bit parallel operation 2
ACCUMULATE 155 bit parallel operation 2
The finished device requires the equivalent of about 17,000 gates and runs at
the design target speed of 10-15 Mhz.
Sutikno et al. also presented the use of non-supersingular elliptic curve group
over GF (2155) and a VLSI implementation of an ElGamal ECC processor
in [182]. The architecture of the ElGamal ECC processor is shown in Fig. 16.
There are eleven 155-bit wide registers to store data and intermediate results
from arithmetic process. 5 registers to store x1, y1, z1, x2 and y2; 4 registers to
store intermediate results A, B, C and D; 1 register to store a6 and 1 cyclic
register to store k. In the control module, there are five control blocks: main
control, repeat square and multiply control, adding point control, doubling
point control and inversion control. The throughput rate for encryption is
estimated as 6.5×10−4 bit/clock cycle and for decryption 13.1×10−4 bit/clock
cycle. The area on FPGA is estimated as 40-50 thousand gates.
Gao et al. proposed an elliptic curve cryptosystem coprocessor with variable
key size, which utilizes the internal SRAM/registers in an FPGA in [64,65].
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Table 5
Instruction Set
Operation Size Clock Cycles
MULT 155 bit blocks 157
INVERSE 23 multiplications approx. 3 887
ADD(A⊕B) 155 bit parallel operation 1
Input(A or B) Store data to A or B by 5-32 bit transfers 11
Output(A, B or C) Load data from A, B, or C 11
by 5-32 bit transfers 11
ROTATE(A, B) 155 bit parallel operation 1
COPY 155 bit parallel operation 5
(A← C)
(B ← C)
SET(A, B, or C) 155 bit parallel operation 1
32−bit
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Latch
Latch
Instructioninstruction
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Input
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Controller
Main Arithmetic
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32−bit
Output
Fig. 15. Architecture of Arithmetic Processor
The architecture of the arithmetic processor is shown in Fig. 17. The con-
troller is the kernel of the scalar multiplier and has the format of an FSM
with table look-up to implement logic functions. All operations can be cate-
gorized as one of the following atomic operations: unconditional jump, con-
ditional jump, operand load, operand store, finite field addition, finite field
squaring, finite field multiplication and finite field inversion. The scalar is de-
composed as a NAF and the scalar multiplication is done with a series of
58
Input
Register
E/D Ac Drec a2 rst
Dreq
IO_in
fin
clk
Control
Module
input(32−bit)
Module
Arithmetic
instruction
k_out
Output
Register
address and control I/O
da
ta
 b
us
M
od
ul
e
R
eg
ist
er
output(32−bit)
Fig. 16. Architecture of the ElGamal ECC Processor
addition/subtractions of elliptic curve points. The mapping/layout results are
shown in Table 6.
The expected mapping results with an estimation formula are listed below:
(1) CLB structure of Xilinx XC4000XL-series:
• 2 FFs per CLB
• 2 function generators (FGs) per CLB (4 input, single output logic unit)
• 2 single port 16× 1 RAMs per CLB (using two logic units)
• 1 dual-port 16× 1 RAMs per CLB (using two logic units)
(2) Cost of implementation basic components
• two m-bit registers 2m FFs
• three m-bit shift registers take 3m FFs and FGs
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Fig. 17. Architecture of Arithmetic Processor
Table 6
FPGA chip area utilization and throughput
Value of m XC4000XL CLB Usage Clock Cycles Throughput
Device (scalar mul/sec)
5 4010XL 272/400 = 68% 126 179,856
11 4013XL 478/576 = 83% 825 19,230
29 4028XL 962/1 024 = 93% 7 158 1 653
53 4044XL 1 626/1 936 = 84% 26,753 417
• four m-bit 2:1 MUXs take 4m FGs
• one m-bit GF Adder takes m FGs
• one m-bit dual-port 9 word RAM takes 2m FGs
• one m-bit 6 word FIFO takes 6(m+ 1) FFs and FGs
• one m-bit 2 word FIFO takes 2(m+ 1) FFs and FGs
• one m-bit GF multiplier takes 5m FFs and 3m FGs
• one m-bit GF inverter takes 3(m+log2m) FFs and FGs (excluding GF
multiplier)
From these building blocks, the cost of one EC scalar multiplier with key size
m is derived as:
• Total FFs = 21m+ 3 log2m+ 48
• Total FGs = 24m+ 3 log2m+ 308
• Minimal number of CLBs = 12m+ (3 log2m)/2 + 154
60
Table 7
Instruction Set
Operation Clock Cycles
NOP 1
XOR 1
Rotate Left, ROTL 1
Shift Right, SHFR 1
Field multiplication, MUL n+ 1
Transfer register value, TFR 1
Jump instructions, JKZ, JCZ, JMP
• Maximal number of CLBs = 45m+ 6 log2m+ 356
Hauck et al. proposed a elliptic curve cryptosystem chip using asynchronous
wave pipelines (AWP) in [85]. They give the simulation results of their de-
sign and reported that circuit run at a rate of 1.5 GHz in 0.35 µm CMOS
technology.
Leung et al. described a Xilinx Virtex based FPGA implementation of an el-
liptic curve processor in [118]. A block diagram of the elliptic curve processor
is shown in Figure 18. It consists of an arithmetic logic unit (ALU), register
file, a microcode sequencer and microcode storage. In ALU a Massey-Omura
Multiplier is used. A 16 × n-bit dual-port synchronous register file is con-
structed from the 16 × 1-bit distributed RAM feature of the Xilinx Virtex
series. The instruction set of the processor is shown in Table 7. Apart from
instructions which directly control the ALU, there are three types of jump
instructions: JMP-jump unconditionally, JKZ-jump if the least significant bit
of K counter is zero and JCZ-jump if the C register is zero. Another FPGA
implementation for 270-bit operations similar to the previous was proposed
by Ernst et al. in [51]. They used XC4085XLA FPGA for implementation and
reported that 180,000 system gates were used. The clock speed was 34 MHz
and resulting performance is 146 point multiplications per second.
Table 8 shows the resource utilization and maximum clock rate reported by
the Xilinx tools for designs with different n.
The total number of cycles required for an elliptic curve multiplication for var-
ious n is given in Table 9. The time required for an elliptic curve multiplication
at the maximum frequency is shown in Table 9.
Orlando and Paar proposed in 2000 a scalable elliptic curve processor archi-
tecture which operates over finite fields GF(2m) in [142]. The elliptic curve
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Fig. 18. ECC Processor Architecture
Table 8
Resource utilization and maximum clock rate for different n on Xilinx XCV300-4.
The Xilinx XCV300 contains 3 072 slices (1 536 CLBs)
n # of slices Max. freq (MHz)
113 1 290 45
155 1 567 36
281 2 622 33
processor (ECP), shown in Figure 19, consists of three main components.
These components are the main controller (MC), the arithmetic unit con-
troller (AUC) and the arithmetic unit (AU). The MC is the ECP’s main
controller. It orchestrates the computation of kP and interacts with the host
system. The AUC controls the AU. It orchestrates the computation of point
additions, point doublings, and coordinate conversions. The AU performs the
GF(2m) field additions, squares, multiplications and inversions under AUC
control. The MC executes the double-and-add and the Montgomery scalar
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Table 9
Execution time for elliptic curve point multiplication
n # of cycles Time (ms)
113 166,738 3.7
155 266,443 6.8
281 474,504 14.4
multiplication (see Lo´pez and R. Dahab [120]) functions, the AUC performs
all the other subroutines and the AU is the hardware that computes the finite
field operations.
command
control
status
command
(kP) (P)(k)
data
control
status
status
control
to/from
host
Arithmetic Unit Controller Arithmetic UnitMain Controller
Program
Memory
Program
Memory
Fig. 19. Elliptic curve processor architecture
The following is a typical sequence of steps for the computation of kP in the
ECP using the double-and-add algorithm and projective coordinates. First,
the host loads k into the MC, loads the coordinates of P into the AU and
commands the MC to start processing. Then, the MC does its initialization,
which includes finding the most significant non-zero coefficient of k. The MC
then commands the AUC to perform its initialization, which includes the
conversion of P from affine to projective coordinates. During the computation
of kP , the MC scans one bit of k at time starting with the second most
significant coefficient and ending with the least significant one. In each of
these iterations, the MC commands the AU/AUC to do a point double. If the
scanned bit is a 1, it also commands the AU/AUC to do a point addition. For
each of these point operations, the AUC generates the control sequence that
guides the AU through the computation of the required field operations. After
the least significant bit of k is processed, the MC commands the AU/AUC to
convert the result back to affine coordinates. When the AU/AUC finishes this
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Table 10
Number of clock cycles required to compute kP over GF(2167)
Operation Double-and-Add Montgomery
# Clock Cycles # Clock Cycles
Point Double 5d167/De+ 25 6d167/De+ 17
Point Add 11d167/De+ 31
Coor. Conv., etc., 13d167/De+ 575 20d167/De+ 764
kP
(10.5d167/De+ 47.5) ∗ 166+
13d167/De+ 575
(6d167/De+ 24) ∗ 166+
20d167/De+ 764
operation, the MC signals to the host the completion of the kP operation.
Finally, the host reads the coordinates of kP from the AU.
Three ECP prototypes were built. These prototypes support elliptic curves
over the field GF(2167), with this field being defined by the field polynomial
F (x) = x167 + x6 + 1.
Each prototype used a 16-bit MC processor with 256 words of program mem-
ory, a 24-bit AUC processor with 512 words of program memory and 128
registers, each of which is 167 bits wide. They also provided 32-bit I/O inter-
face to the host system. The prototypes used LSD multipliers with digit sizes
equal to 4, 8 and 16. The prototypes were implemented using the Xilinix’s
XCV400E8BG432 (Virtex E) FPGA. The ECP prototypes were tested with
two programs. One of the programs implemented the projective coordinates
version of the Montgomery scalar multiplication algorithm and the other the
projective coordinates version of the traditional double-and-add algorithm,
none of which relies on precomputation. The number of clock cycles required
to compute kP for each of the programs is summarized in Table 10. D is the
digit size of the multiplier being used.
For both elliptic curve algorithms, the MC program used 56% of the MC’s
program memory. The AUC program used 90-98% of the AUC’s program
memory depending on the algorithm and the digit size. Table 11 approximates
the number of cycles required for the computation of point multiplication
for arbitrary GF(2m) fields. The approximations are based exclusively on the
number of multiplications and the number of clock cycles required to compute
them with an LSD multiplier with digit size D. The inversion is assumed
to require blog2(m − 1)c +W (m − 1) − 1 multiplications, where W (m − 1)
represents the number of non-zero coefficients in the binary representation of
m− 1.
The logic complexity of the ECP prototypes is summarized in Table 12 in
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Table 11
Approximation of number of clock cycles required to compute kP over GF(2m)
Operation Double-and-Add # ClockCycles Montgomery# ClockCycles
Point Double 5dm/De 6dm/De
Point Add 11dm/De
Coor. Conv., etc.,
(3 + (blog2(m− 1)c+
W (m− 1)− 1))dm/De
(10 + (blog2(m− 1)c+
W (m− 1)− 1))dm/De
kP
(10.5(m− 1) + 3 + (blog2(m− 1)c+
W (m− 1)− 1))dm/De
(6(m− 1) + 10 + (blog2(m− 1)c+
W (m− 1)− 1))dm/De
Table 12
Logic complexity of ECP prototypes
Digit size # LUTs # FFs # Block RAMs
4 1 627 1 745 10
8 2 136 1 753 10
16 3 002 1 769 10
terms of the main components of modern FPGAs. These components are
lookup tables (LUT) which are used as programmable gates, flipflops (FF) and
Block RAM which are configurable 4kbit RAMs. The normalized complexity
of the ECP prototypes is approximately 228 + 6.6m+ (d2D/3e − 1)m LUTs,
224 + 9.2m FFs and 4 + dm/32e 4kbit Block RAMs for m >> D, 4-input
LUTs, 32-bit Block RAMs and D a multiple of 4.
The prototype implementations used between 15% and 28% of the LUTs (de-
pending on the digit size), 16% of the FFs and 25% of the Block RAMs
available in the XCV400E8BG432 FPGA. Together, the AUC and the MC
processors, ignoring the complexity of the register that holds the k operand,
used less than 13% of the logic resources and 40% of the memory elements. In
turn, the AU used 76-87% of the LUTs, 59% of the flipflops and 60% of the
memory elements. The remaining resources were used by system I/O logic.
Goodman and Chandrakasan proposed a domain-specific reconfigurable cryp-
tographic processor (DSRCP) in [70]. The instruction set definition of the
DSRCP was dictated by the IEEE 1363 Public Key Cryptography Standard
document [189]. A list of the arithmetic functions required to implement the
various primitives defined in the standard was tabulated in a functional ma-
trix, which was then used to define the instruction set architecture (ISA) of
the processor. The ISA contains 24 instructions broken up into six types of op-
erations: conventional arithmetic, modular integer arithmetic, GF arithmetic,
elliptic curve field arithmetic over GF, register manipulation and processor
configuration. The processor consists of four main architectural blocks: the
global controller and microcode ROMs, the I/O interface, the shutdown con-
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Table 13
DSRCP Instruction Mapping Within The Control Hierarchy
Part Instructions
I ADD, SUB, COMP, GF INV, GF INVMULT, GF MULT, GF ADD,
MONTRED, MONTMULT, MONTRED A, SET LENGTH
II EC DOUBLE, EC ADD, MOD ADD, MOD SUB, GF EXP
III EC MULT, MOD MULT, MOD, MOD INV, MOD EXP
troller and the reconfigurable datapath. Operands used within the processor
can vary in size from 8 to 1 024 bits requiring the use of a flexible I/O interface
that allows the user to transfer data to/from the processor in a very efficient
manner. The primary component of the DSRCP is the reconfigurable data-
path. The datapath consists of four major functional blocks: an eight-word
register file, a fast adder unit, a comparator unit and the main reconfigurable
logic unit.
The DSRCP performs a variety of algorithms ranging from modular integer
arithmetic to elliptic curve arithmetic over GF. All operations are universal
in that they can be performed using any valid n-bit modulus (8 ≤ n ≤ 1 024),
GF (2n) field polynomial and non-supersingular elliptic curve over GF (2n).
The various complex modular arithmetic operations (multiplication, reduc-
tion, inversion and exponentiation) are implemented using microcode, while
simple operations (addition and subtraction) are implemented directly in hard-
ware using the wide adder and comparator units. Multiplication is performed
using Montgomery multiplication [130].
The instruction set partitioning of the three-level control hierarchy is shown
in Table 13. The first part of control corresponds to those instructions that are
implemented directly in hardware. The second part of control represents the
first level of microcoded instructions that are composed of sequences of first-
part instructions. Similarly, the third part of control represents instructions
that consist of sequences of both first- and second-part instructions. Each
microcode controller consists of a small ROM core, an input selector which
gates the appropriate values onto the corresponding operand signals and a
control FSM that also serves as the ROM address generator.
The processor is fabricated in a 0.25-µm CMOS technology with five levels of
metallization. The core contains 880,000 devices and measures 2.9× 2.9mm2.
The datapath consists of 1 024 processing bit-slices, each of which measures
30 × 150µm2. At 50 MHz, the processor operates at a supply voltage of 2 V
and consumes at most 75 mW of power. In ultra-low-power mode (3 MHz at
VDD = 0.7V ), the processor consumes at most 525 µW.
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Janssens et al. proposed a high-speed hardware/software co-design for com-
puting elliptic curve point multiplications and implemented on an Atmel Field
Programmable System Level Integration Circuit (FPSLIC) [95]. The design
hierarchy is shown in Figure 20. The design consists of a Data-path, which
performs the finite field arithmetic and two finite state machines that each con-
trols a particular part of the functionality at a particular level of hierarchy. At
the highest level the Software Controller is the master. It gives instructions to
the Hardware Controller, which translates these instructions in a sequence of
direct control signals for the operators in the Data-path.
Diffie−Hellman key exchange protocol
Double, add, substract
on points of the elliptic curve
Point Multiplication
Addition, substraction, multiplication
add squaring on finite field elements
FPGA
Hardware Controller
Data−Path
FPGA
Software Controller
AVR
THEORETICAL IMPLEMENTATION
Fig. 20. The design hierarchy
The design flow which is proposed by the Atmel System Designer software
was followed. On average, 125n instructions for the AVR are needed to read
in data, perform the point multiplication and write out the results. Since the
embedded AVR core achieves throughput approaching 1 MIPS per MHz, this
corresponds with 125n clock cycles. The critical path after synthesis is 33 ns.
The corresponding maximum clock frequency is nearly 30 MHz. After place-
and-route it turned out that 23 Combinatorial Logic Blocks (CLBs) are needed
per bit slice and 496 CLBs for the hardware controller. Since there are only
2 304 CLBs available on the FPGA, a design for a key length of 72 bits can
be implemented.
The results above are used to estimate the total time it takes to perform a com-
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Table 14
FPSLIC chip area utilization and throughput
Value of n CLB Usage Clock Cycles Point mult/sec Point mult/sec
10 MHz 200 MHz
8 668 768 13,020 260,416
16 852 3 072 3 255 65,104
72 2 189 62,208 160 3 215
192 4 097 442,368 22 452
plete point multiplication. Since the Software Controller is always waiting on
an interrupt from the Hardware Controller before sending a new instruction,
the Hardware Controller receives this new instruction almost directly after it
has finished performing the former instruction. Therefore we can take only the
number of clock cycles needed by the hardware part, which is in the average
case 12n2. Table 14 presents the number of clock cycles, the corresponding
throughput and CLB Usage for different key lengths.
Schaumont and Verbauwhede introduced an Elliptic Curve Processor over
GF (2n) in [168,169]. The architecture has a layered structure with the layers
corresponding to the operations described in the security pyramid. The au-
thors propose a language and simulation environment that allows to explore
the design of security domain specific processors at a high abstraction level.
Bednara et al. gave a comparison of several ways for hardware implementation
of elliptic curve cryptosystems in [17]. They especially focused on FPGA based
implementations. Kim and Lee presented in [101] an elliptic curve processor
which consists of control unit, arithmetic unit and register unit.
6 Conclusions
We have presented an overview of the wide variety of architectures which
have been designed to implement Public Key Cryptography. Creating a work-
ing implementation was a significant challenge in the 1980’s; the number of
hardware implementations that made it to prototype or production phase
was very limited. In the 1990’s, we have seen significant progress due to a
combination of better algorithms and advances in VLSI technology. In addi-
tion, Elliptic Curve Cryptography may allow more compact implementations.
Cryptographic hardware accelerator modules are now a commodity for Vir-
tual Private Networks (VPNs) and e-commerce transactions; they can even
be found in smart card co-processors. In the area of smart cards, we have seen
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an increasing number of compact yet performant co-processors for Public Key
Cryptography.
To summarize: reviewing various hardware architectures for PKC one conclu-
sion is imposing itself. Hardware as seen in 80’s is still relevant in the sense
of its fundamentals such as systolic array and RNS realizations. On the other
hand, for ECC hardware is still a long way to go. Also, both algorithms are
constantly being pushed by current applications to be even faster (which usu-
ally implies more secure), in order to fulfill industry and government demands.
There is no doubt that in the coming years even more performant hardware
implementations will be developed for high-end applications. We believe that
the biggest challenge ahead may be the development of very compact and inex-
pensive low-power implementations that allow protection for personal devices
and devices used in the context of ambient intelligence. A second challenge is
to develop efficient implementations that offer adequate security against the
ever more sophisticated side-channel attacks.
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